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Abstract
Essays on Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Costs and Migration
Eugene Bempong Nyantakyi
This dissertation consists of three essays on trade and investment costs and migration.
The first paper documents how timeliness induces U.S. parent firms to adjust their
trade activities with affiliates located abroad, and the extent to which these adjust-
ments change according to the time sensitivity of the industry in which the multina-
tional enterprise (MNE) operates. The results show that parent firms operating in
manufacturing are sensitive to shipping time. Long shipping lags reduce parent firms’
import from (export to) affiliates. At the sectoral level, there exists some heterogeneity
in MNE’s response to time. When MNEs are ranked on a spectrum of time sensitivity,
those operating in computers and machinery are shown to be more time sensitive, with
coefficients consistently surpassing that of other industries. Those operating in chemi-
cals and metals appear to be less time sensitive. The results suggest that, countries that
focus on reducing bottlenecks and building infrastructure that promote efficient and
fast movement of goods across borders are not only promoting trade but more subtly,
improving their participation in the global production networks in manufacturing.
The second paper presents empirical evidence on the effects of variable and fixed
costs of export on the extensive and intensive margins of trade for South vs. North
exporters. In particular, we search for the presence of any systematic development
related bias, where South exporters face higher market access friction relative to North
exporters. At the extensive margin, where we compare the effects of fixed and variable
costs on the probability of success in entering export markets, we do not find any
significant development related bias. Similarly, at the intensive margin, where we
examine the effect of observable variable cost on the export volume of successfully
entrants into export markets, we do not find any significant North-South bias.
The last essay examines how foreign-born migrants from developing countries (South)
attract foreign direct investment (FDI) from developed countries (North) to their coun-
tries’ of origin. South migrants have information advantage over North investors con-
cerning the nature of the investment climate in their home countries. Transfer of this
knowledge can lower start-up barriers and help match North investors with investment
opportunities in the South. Using bilateral migration and FDI data for 18 OECD and
101 developing countries, the empirical evidence suggests that, high stock of South
migrants in North is associated with higher FDI flow from North to South. However,
the hypothesis that the positive effects of South-North migration on North-South FDI
may be stronger when the start-up costs of investment is higher is the South is not
strongly supported by the data.
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Chapter 1
Time Cost and Multinational
Firms’ Trade in Manufacturing
1.1 Introduction
Timeliness matters for international production and manufacturing networks. Multi-
national firms are increasingly adopting production and distribution techniques (e.g,
lean retailing, just-in-time manufacturing etc.) in which efficient and timely delivery
of intermediate and final goods are of the utmost importance. Millions of electronic
parts and components cross borders each day, moving to assembly plants scattered
around the globe for further processing. As noted by Yi (2003), steel from Japan is
exported to Mexico, where it is stamped, pressed, and shipped to the United States
to be converted to farm equipment, some of which is re-exported back to Japan. Sim-
ilarly, fashion clothing and electronic gadgets manufactured in very distant places are
delivered to final consumers within a short period after an order is placed. Zara, a
vertically integrated designer clothing company, manufactures its products primarily
in Spain and Portugal, but twice a week, Zara’s clothing arrives at affiliate retail stores
located in over 80 countries around the world.1 This cross border trade between parent
1A more detailed article on Zara’s timely retail approach appeared in the The Economist (“Floating
on Air,” May 17, 2001).
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firms and their affiliates may imply that manufacturing MNEs engaged in international
production are in need of speed, and the ability to move goods across borders on time
should be an important consideration in parent firms’ integration strategies with foreign
affiliates.2
However, previous empirical analyses on MNEs integration decisions have mainly
focused on the monetary costs of parent-affiliate trade. Among the broad themes that
have attracted attention in the literature are tariffs, (Feinberg and Keane, 2001; Yi,
2003), corporate taxes and transfer pricing, (Hanson et al., 2005; Wei, 2000; Grubert
and Mutti, 1991), wages and skill intensity (Carr et al., 2003; Budd et al., 2005; Yeaple,
2003b) and transportation cost. Little emphasis in the literature has been placed on
how time costs affect how parent firms choose their affiliates across countries, but
there exists anecdotal evidence in popular press and business reports emphasizing the
importance of timeliness to MNEs dealing in manufactured goods.3 TPG, a transport
group, contracts with Ford to move parts and components to its assembly plant in
Toronto, Canada. To keep the assembly plant running like a clockwork, TPG organizes
around 800 deliveries a day from 300 different affiliates. Parts are loaded into delivery
trucks in a pre-arranged sequence to speed up the unloading process when they arrive at
the assembly plant. Loads arrive at 12 different points along the assembly line without
ever being more than 10 minutes late.4 While such anecdotal evidence is commonplace,
empirical evidence on the importance of timeliness for parent-affiliate trade is lacking.
Using sectoral level data on United States multinational firms operating in the man-
2According toThe New York Times (“How the U.S. Lost Out on iPhone Work, ”January 21, 2012),
“an estimated 90 percent of iPhone parts are manufactured abroad. Advance semiconductors from
Germany and Taiwan, memory chips from Korea and Japan, display panels and circuitry from Korea
and Taiwan, chipsets from Europe and rare metals from Africa and Asia. And all of it put together
in China.”
3According to the “New York Times” article above ... for technology companies, the cost of labor is
minimal compared with the expense of buying parts and managing supply chains that bring together
components and services from hundreds of companies.
4The Economist (“A Moving Story,” December 5, 2002). Exel, a shipping liner and a road hauler
has a deal with Maxtor, a maker of computer disk-drives, that requires it to ship computer drives
from factories in Asia to companies such as Dell and HP in Asia and America, all within 48 hours.
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ufacturing industry, this paper documents how timeliness in shipping across countries
induces United States’ parent multinational firms to adjust their trade activities with
affiliates located abroad, and the extent to which these adjustments change according
to the time sensitivity of the industry in which a parent firm operates. The starting
premise is that multinational firms operating in manufacturing are linked with their
affiliates through parent-affiliate trade in intermediate and final goods. The time it
takes for goods to reach parent firms from subsidiary plants abroad should influence
the trade strategies of parent multinational firms.5 Understanding the role of time-
liness in global production networks and the heterogeneous response to timeliness by
MNEs operating in different industries is important for understanding why a handful
of countries have become dominant players in global manufacturing as well as why the
characteristics of certain industries make them amenable to such production strategies.
The results from this study suggest that parent firms operating in manufacturing
locate affiliate activities in countries with efficient shipping infrastructure. Long ship-
ping lags reduce parent firms’ import from (export to) affiliates. At the sectoral level,
there exists some heterogeneity in the MNE’s response to delays. When MNEs are
ranked on a spectrum of time sensitivity, those operating in computers and machinery
are shown to be the more time sensitive, with coefficients consistently surpassing those
of other industries. Those operating in chemicals and metals appear less sensitive to
delays, although results for the metal industry are not consistent across all estimates.
The results are robust to changes in different measures of timeliness, trade activities be-
tween parent firms and affiliates and additional controls. Hence, countries that focus on
reducing bottlenecks and building infrastructure that promote efficient and fast move-
ment of goods across borders are not only promoting trade but more subtly, improving
their participation in the global production networks in manufacturing.
Substantively, this paper and its findings are closely related to the growing literature
5Some theoretical discussions of the importance of timeliness to the global production network are
found in the next section.
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on timeliness and international trade that concludes that long shipping lags reduce trade
volume. In a pioneering work, Hummels (2001) and Hummels and Schaur (2012) use
U.S. import data to examine consumers’ valuation of time through the premium paid
on air shipping choice, which is fast but expensive relative to the slow but inexpensive
ocean cargo. Their estimates suggest that a day in transit is equivalent to an ad-valorem
tariff of 0.6 to 2.3 percent. They find that the most time sensitive trade flows are those
involving trade in parts and components. Djankov et al. (2010) incorporates delays
in a standard gravity model to measure the effect of export time on exports across
countries. They use the number of days it takes to move goods from the factory gate to
the shipping port as a measure of timeliness. They estimate that each day a product is
delayed prior to shipping reduces trade by about 1 percent. For export of time sensitive
agricultural goods in developing countries, the effect of delay is a 6% reduction in export
volume. Evans and Harrigan (2005) argue that timely delivery is important because it
allows retailers to respond to fluctuations in demand without costly inventories. This
has an implication for agglomeration in that products that require timely delivery will
be produced near the source of final demand.6 The paper differs from the existing
literature primarily in its attempt towards identifying causal linkages between time
cost and parent firms’ choice of affiliate abroad, and the sensitivity of firms of parent
firms operating in different industries to delays.
This paper also relates to the literature on parent-affiliate integration decisions,
(Yeats, 1998; Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Borga and Zeile, 2004; Hanson et al., 2005)
that finds that tariffs, taxes, and transport costs limit integration decisions of U.S.
multinational firms. It also provides some support to the literature on the effects
of infrastructural development on trade and investment (Limao and Venables, 2001;
6Others have also discussed the importance of timeliness in trade. Nordas (2006) finds similar
results. In his estimates, timeliness increases trade volume. He argues that labor intensive products
such as clothing and electronics are increasingly becoming time sensitive. Hornok (2009) argues that
saving an hour waiting at an inland border has a 0.4% ad-volorem tariff equivalent effect within the
EU.
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Clark et al., 2004) that finds that port efficiency and infrastructural development are
important for bilateral trade.7
In the analysis, I do not attempt to distinguish the effects of timeliness on MNEs
that integrate vertically (Helpman, 1984) from those that do so horizontally (Markusen,
1984). One can make the case that timeliness is useful in the case of the former, where
outsourcing of cheap factors requires the sequential flow of goods between parent firms
and their affiliates, and less applicable to the latter, where a firm’s decision is to serve
the domestic market and avoid any kind of physical exchange of goods between parents
and affiliates.8 With these caveats in mind, I believe that restricting the data on
MNEs to those operating in manufacturing and trading with affiliates abroad mitigates
the problem of obtaining nonsensical results. In practice however, as Borga and Zeile
(2004) and Yeaple (2003a) argue and recent theoretical (Markusen, 2004) and empirical
(Carr et al., 2001, 2003; Awokuse et al., 2012) developments of the knowledge-capital
model of the multinational firm substantiate, location decisions are complex and an
MNE may have production chains that form part of a network of sequential production
across borders and other affiliates that exist to serve only local markets in either final
inputs or intermediates.9
7 Using the 1994 benchmark survey data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Borga
and Zeile (2004) documents that the share of intermediate goods exported from U.S. parent firms to
their affiliates increased from 8% of U.S. export in 1977 to about 15% in 1999. Budd et al. (2005)
find substantial evidence of vertical trade between U.S. multinational firms and their affiliates. Yeats
(1998) finds that intermediate input trade has grown faster than final goods trade. In manufacturing,
his estimates suggest that intermediate input trade accounts for about 30% of world trade. In 1999,
93% of exports from U.S. parent firms to their subsidiaries in manufacturing were inputs for further
processes.
8Goods are produced near the source of final consumption and any kind of outsourcing in done
locally. Hence delays matter only to the extent that it impedes supply chain within that country
or a neighboring country for which the host country serves as an export platform. A McDonald’s
franchise in Germany for instance will have little exchange of physical goods if at all with its parent
headquarters in Illinois, U.S.A.
9Others have argued about the complex relationship between the firm’s motive for integration
decisions. For example, Alfaro and Charlton (2009) find that the extent of vertical trade between
parent firms and their affiliates is missed at the 2-digit level since subsidiaries are supplying goods to
their parents where both inputs and final goods are in the same 2-digit SIC code making it difficult
to discern the pattern of vertical trade between parent firms and subsidiaries.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some the-
oretical reasons for the importance of timeliness for MNEs integration decisions with
affiliates. Section 3 presents the econometric model for the empirical estimation. Sec-
tion 4 discusses the data, its limitations and presents some initial preliminary statistics
on the variables of interest. Section 5 discusses the empirical results and key findings.
Section 6 presents some sensitivity checks and section 7 concludes with some remarks
on economic policy.
1.2 Why Time Matters to MNEs
Theoretically, there are several reasons why timely and efficient delivery of goods
may matter for the integration decisions between parent firms and their affiliates. Hum-
mels (2001) and Deardorff (2003) have discussed some potential importance for speed
in global production and trade.
In a global manufacturing network, the production chain in one country depends
on the efficient and timely delivery of inputs from plants in other countries. As parts
and components move from one production plant to another, they make repeated trips
across borders. If subsidiaries in a country with long shipping lags are part of the
production chain, delays from those affiliates may impede the timing of the entire
production chain. In the extreme case, excessive delays from a subsidiary may halt
production as parent firms (or other affiliates) wait for parts and components to arrive.
The effects are magnified when several countries are involved in the production process
because delays will accumulate through the entire supply chain. To hedge against this
risk, firms will have to invest heavily in keeping inventories, which is self-defeating to
the ideas of lean retailing and supply chain management that both demand greater
flexibility and the ability to adjust productivity to cut down on inventory costs.10
10In practice, goods may move from one affiliate to another within the same country before crossing
borders to production plants abroad. Trade activities may also occur between affiliates without the
involvement of a parent firm. The same argument may also hold for firms shipping to retailers in other
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Timely delivery of products is especially important if parent-affiliate trade involves
time sensitive goods where product life cycles are measured in weeks or days. The longer
such goods stay in transit, the more they lose value. This is typical in electronics and
computers, where new innovation and design consistently push current gadgets out
of fashion, or perishable agricultural goods, where a product’s lifespan are usually
measured in days. In a sequential production process spanning multiple countries with
several affiliates, value lost in transit in the early stages of production will accrue to
the final stage. This means firms have to invest in preserving goods in transit or final
output going to consumers has to be sold at a discount.
Improved technology and communication have also created a system where final
consumers are no longer tolerant of delays that were previously acceptable. As discussed
by Deardorff (2001), consumers change their tastes and preferences with surprising
speed and firms have to adjust both what they produce and when they deliver it to the
market with equal speed to match consumers’ needs. Clothing retailers like Zara adopt a
delivery approach that gives them an edge over competitors in an industry characterized
by fickle fashion trends. For the same reason, many multinationals nowadays announce
release dates of new products and honor their commitment to get them to the market on
time. Firms that engage in global manufacturing networks that are located in countries
with efficient shipping system can potentially benefit from industrial technology that is
transferred through intermediate-inputs exchange. Ciccone (2002) shows that industrial
technologies adaptation along the supply chain leads to an increase in productivity and
aggregate income.
1.3 Empirical Estimations
For estimation purposes, let i index the host country (affiliates of parent multi-
national firms), k index the five industries (including aggregate manufacturing) and t
countries.
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index the year. The U.S. is always the home country of the parent multinational firm
and would be denoted by j. I model an outcome of interest, ykit, which could be U.S.
parent firms’ sales to or import from affiliates. I assume that the relationship between
timeliness and sales or imports from affiliates takes the form:
ln(ykit) = βtimecostit + π
′zit + γt + u
k
it (1.1)
The key covariate of interest is timecostit, which for now, will be defined as the number
of days it takes to get consignments from the factory gate to the shipping port and
load them onto a ship within a given host country i in a particular year t. zit is a
vector of observable characteristics that are specific to the host country i at time t
such as tariffs, host country’s market size, corporate tax burden, manufacturing wages,
land size, institutional quality and also distance (transport cost) and linguistic ties
that are bilateral and time invariant between i and j. γt is a time trend that captures
unobserved time variant characteristics that can influence trade between parent firms
and affiliates (e.g. technology and growth of parent firms) and uit is an error term.
Variable selection and measurement is discussed in greater detail in section 1.4.
Some observations in the BEA data for parent firm’s activities in the host countries
are not reported due to confidentiality. After filtering those observations out, there are
cases in which parent firms do not engage with affiliates in some countries for some
years and hence have observations that are reported as zero. If these zero observations
are based on observable characteristics that make the host country undesirable for
investment in any particular year, using ordinary least squares (OLS) may lead to
inconsistent estimates since only observations for which ukit > −πzkit will be included in
the sample for regression estimates. I therefore follow Hanson et al. (2005) and Awokuse
et al. (2012) and employ a Tobit model specification and estimate the model using
maximum likelihood. Collapsing βtimeCostit and γt under πzit, the Tobit estimation






















∗ is a latent variable and ln(ykit) is realized trade activity between parent




it is positive, parent firms will undertake positive




it is less than
or equal to zero, realized integration activities of parent firms will be zero in the host
country. Since it is not possible to take logs when zeros are included in the sample,
I transform the dependent variable into ln(ykit + 1) and estimate the model for each
industry k. Except linguistic ties and Free trade agreement (FTA) that are binary
variables, all the independent variables enter the equation in log form. The results are




For empirical estimation, I collect data on U.S. parent firm activities with affiliates
for 2006 and 2009 from the U.S. BEA, which collects publicly available comprehensive
financial and operational data on U.S. multinational corporations and their affiliates
located abroad. These data include sales to all foreign affiliates and import from all
foreign affiliates. For reasons discussed in section 1.1, I restrict attention to the man-
ufacturing industries in 5 sub-categories that include chemical products (chemicals),
fabricated metals (metals), machinery, electronics & computer (computers) and elec-
trical equipment.11 Some features of this data are worth emphasizing. After filtering
11This allows me to exclude services and non-tradable activities such as real estate, hotels, tech-
nical services, insurance and financial services, which may rarely involve cross border trade. Similar
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out regional groupings, the data are available for 62 countries but some countries do
not have any observations. Dropping these countries leaves 55 countries with a total of
220 observations for the 4 years under consideration. The list of countries is presented
in table 1.8. Tables 1.1 shows the share of U.S. parent firms’ sales and import from af-
filiates by industry and region. Europe receives the bulk of parent firm’s sales, followed
by Asia and Pacific. 50 percent of total sales go to affiliates located in Europe. For
all sales to Canada, metals and chemicals forms the highest share, of 12 and 8 percent
respectively. This suggests the importance of proximity of Canada of affiliates in this
industry. 12
1.4.2 Timeliness
For each country and year, I extract corresponding measures of timeliness from the
World Bank Doing Business website. I use both time to export and import for each
country and year. Time is measured as the number of days it takes to export or import
goods from the factory gate to the shipping port. The time calculation for a procedure
starts from the moment it is initiated and runs until it is completed. In collecting the
data, the survey assumes that neither the importer nor the exporter wastes time and
each is committed to completing each remaining procedure without delay. Shipping
procedures that can be completed in parallel are measured simultaneously. If time
cost is measured by this standard, export time is 5 days in both Singapore (SGP)
and Denmark (DNK). In Russia (RUS) and Venezuela (VEN), it is 36 and 45 days
respectively in 2007. Hence, if a parent firm initiates an order from an affiliate in
approaches were used by Awokuse et al. (2012) and Hanson et al. (2005). For more information on
the industry classification by the BEA see http://www.bea.gov/surveys/pdf/be799.pdf
12Canada and Mexico enjoy special trade agreements with the U.S. through the membership of
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which allows free movement of most manufacturing
goods between them. The two countries enjoy closer geographic proximity to the U.S. especially in the
case of Canada where proximity to the major automobile manufacturing centers. The United States-
Canada Auto Agreements, dating back to 1965, gives Canadian affiliates a special advantage. Also,
multinational firms engaged with affiliates in Mexico enjoy tariff exemptions from imported parts for
re-export to the United States under provisions of the maquiladora program that preceded NAFTA.
Chapter 1. Time Cost and Multinational Firms’ Trade in Manufacturing 11
Denmark or Singapore, it will take approximately 5 days for the goods to go through
all customs procedures and get on board a ship whereas it will take approximately 36
days in Russia and 45 days in Venezuela.
For sensitivity analysis, I also use the logistic performance index, which captures
freight forwarders perception of a country’s logistics quality. This is the average of
six indicators of logistic performance, including efficiency of the customs clearance
process, quality of trade and transport infrastructure, ease of arranging competitively
priced shipping, quality of logistic services, the ability to track and trace consignments,
and the frequency with which shipments reach the consignee within the scheduled time.
It is an index that ranges from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating the highest logistics quality.
To make the expected signs of the logistic quality index coefficients consistent with the
initial measure of timeliness, I recode this index by subtracting each country’s score
from 6 so that a value of 1 reflects the highest logistics quality and 5 reflects the lowest
logistics quality. Positive perception of a country’s overall logistics quality would be
expected to be positively correlated with integration activities with affiliates in that
country.
1.4.3 Other Covariates
Consistent with the literature on parent firms’ integration with affiliates, I extract
covariates from other sources to match the above dataset. Manufacturing tariff is
obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database 2011. I use the
weighted mean applied tariff, which is the average of effectively applied rates weighted
by the product import shares corresponding to each partner country for manufacturing
products classified under section 5-8 of the Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC) revision 3. Average wage rate is the ratio of total compensation paid to em-
ployees to the total number of wage salary workers in the host country obtained from
the WDI. Real GDP, measured in 2005 dollars captures the host country’s market size.
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Land size captures the host country’s total area measured in square kilometers exclud-
ing area under inland water bodies, national claims to continental shelf, and exclusive
economic zones. I use the strength of the legal system in the host country to mea-
sure the quality of the host country’s institution. It is an index that ranges from 1 to
10, with 10 indicating the highest strength of legal system. From the CEPII bilateral
database provided by Head et al. (2010), I extract two other covariates. Linguistic ties
is a binary variable that is one if English is the official language in the host country
and zero otherwise. It proxies the effects of language and communication costs that
parent firms incur to do business with affiliates abroad. Distance measured in kilome-
ters indicates how far the host country is from the U.S. It captures the effect of trade
and investment costs that parent firms incur abroad.
1.5 Results and Implications
Before presenting econometrics results, Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between
total import from affiliates by parent firms and export time in the affiliates’ home
country. There is a negative correlation between the days to export and total import
from affiliates. A similar pattern is observed when parent firms’ sales to affiliates are
plotted against the affiliates’ country import time as shown in Figure 1.2. These plots
suggest that all things equal, higher shipping time decreases sales to or import from
affiliates. The preceding sections present formal tests using the Tobit model specified
in section 1.3.
1.5.1 Shipping Time and Imports from Affiliates
Table 1.2 presents the estimation results of the effect of timeliness on U.S. parent
firms’ imports from their foreign affiliates for both total manufacturing and the 5 sub-
categories. In column (1) a 1 percent increase in shipping time decreases imports from
affiliates by 3 percent. The magnitude of the coefficient is suggestive of the average
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size of the effect of timeliness on import. Manufacturing wage has a negative and
significant effect on parent firm’s imports. A 1 percent increase in the wage paid to
manufacturing workers reduces imports from affiliates by 1 percent. This is consistent
with the literature on the comparative advantage motive of U.S. FDI in manufacturing,
(Hanson et al., 2005; Yeaple, 2003b). Hence, as wage increases in the host country,
parent firms decrease their activities with foreign affiliates. Imports from affiliates
also increases with host country’s market size with a 1 percent increase in market
size increasing imports by 0.9 percent. The remaining columns from (2)-(6) perform
similar estimations by sector. The objective is to examine if there are any heterogeneous
responses to timeliness by the various industries under manufacturing after controlling
for other observable characteristics. All coefficients on timeliness have the expected
signs except in the metal industry. Relative to the chemical, metal and electrical
industries, the negative effect of timeliness is higher on the machinery and computer
industries. A 1 percent increase in shipping time decreases import by 3 percent in
the machinery industry and 2 percent in the computer industry. The other covariates
generally have the expected signs with conventional statistical significance at the 1
percent level. Overall, import from affiliates increases with the host country’s market
size and decreases with distance. A notable observation is the higher magnitude of
the distance coefficients for the chemical and metal industries. A 1 percent increase
in distance decreases imports from the chemical and metal industries by 1.7 and 1.9
percent respectively.
To confirm whether the pattern in the results above are representative, I perform
some sensitivity analyses by adding additional control variables to those already pre-
sented in Table 1.2. The results are presented in Table 1.3. Although the magnitude
of the coefficients on timeliness falls after controlling for linguistic ties, bilateral trade
agreements and legal strength, the pattern observed in the previous estimates in Table
1.2 are quite representative. Except in the metal and chemical industries, long shipping
lags reduce parent firms’ import from foreign affiliates. The negative effect is higher on
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the machinery and computer industries. A 1 percent increase in the time lag for ship-
ping decreases import from foreign affiliates by 2.6 percent and 2 percent respectively
in machinery and computer industries. Except in the computer industry, sharing a
similar language increases parent firm’s import but the coefficient reaches conventional
statistical significance only in the chemical and electrical industries. Land size has a
negative and statistically significant effect on imports from affiliates in all industries but
chemicals. Similarly, free trade agreements increase parent firm’s import from affiliates
in the chemical and metal industries while legal strength has the expected positive sign
in columns (1) and (6) for total manufacturing and electrical industries respectively.
1.5.2 Shipping Time and Sales to Affiliates
I repeat the estimation procedure in section 1.5.1 for parent firms’ sales to foreign
affiliates. The variable of interest is the number of days to import in the host country.
Initial results are presented in Table 1.4. In column (1), timeliness has a negative
effect on total sales to affiliates. A 1 percent increase in import time decreases sales
to affiliates by 1 percent. The coefficient is significant at 1 percent. At the sectoral
level, timeliness has no signficant effect on the chemical and metal industries. For
the computer industry, a 1 percent increase in shipping time reduces sales to affiliates
by 2.4 percent. In machinery, the reduction in sales is 1.7 percent. Consistent with
the previous estimates, it appears that the negative correlation between timeliness and
sales to affiliates is stronger for those two industries compared to the electrical, metals
and chemicals industries. For the rest of the covariates, parent firms’ sales to affiliates
is increasing with rising host country’s market size and decreasing with rising wage
rate, host country’s land size and bilateral distance between the host country and the
United States.
To confirm the robustness of the initial effects of timeliness on parent firms’ sales to
affiliates obtained in Table 1.4, I repeat the estimation by adding additional controls
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as that performed in Table 1.3. The results are presented in Table 1.5. Controlling for
linguistic similarities, trade agreements, tariffs, and legal strength lead to a reduction
in the magnitude of the initial coefficients on timeliness. In column (1), the coefficients
of the covariates are suggestive of the average effect of timeliness on sales to affiliates.
A 1 percent increase in shipping lags reduces sales by 0.7 percent. Sales to affiliates are
increasing with host country’s market size, common language, and trade agreements.
In the computer industry, a 1 percent increase in delay decreases export by about 2.4
percent. The relatively large magnitude of this coefficient on machinery and computers
is again suggestive of sensitivity to time of firms in those two sectors. In the chemical
industry, timeliness has a negative effect on sales to affiliates with a conventional sta-
tistical significance at 10 percent. The effect of the other covariates on export follows a
pattern similar to that in table 4. Land size has a negative and statistically significant
effect on sales to affiliates in all industries except the metal industry. Sharing a similar
language reduces communication and transaction costs and increases sales to affiliates.
Large market size is also positively correlated with sales to affiliates. Parent firm’s sales
to affiliates also decreases with increases in host country’s manufacturing wage, FTA
agreements and transport costs as measured by distance.
1.5.3 Some Patterns and Possible Explanations
Estimation results suggest that time cost is negatively correlated with parent firms’
trade activities with affiliates located abroad. At the sectoral level, the absolute mag-
nitude of the coefficients on time are higher for the machinery and computer industry
relative to the other industries. This suggests that firms operating in computers and
electronics are more time sensitive compared to those operating in metals and chem-
icals. Another observed pattern is the higher distance elasticity for the metal and
chemical industries. However, market size and manufacturing wages do not exhibit any
uniform pattern across estimates by industry.
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Some possible economic intuitions explaining these patterns come to mind. MNEs
operating in computer products are known for their relatively wide outsourcing and
integration activities. Product design generally involves headquarter activities whereas
part and components assembly can span several countries. This is also the industry
where new innovation and design consistently pushes current gadgets out of fashion.
Borga and Zeile (2004) and Hanson et al. (2005) argue that the physical separability
of of the production process in these industries makes them amenable to a global
production process. These same characteristics may also make them more sensitive to
time. If production and assembly are highly separable across several production plants
and depreciation is a concern due to rapid innovation or short product life span, then
firms in these industries have an incentive to ship products across affiliates and parents
on time until goods reach the end user.
However, firms operating in metals and chemicals are characterized by products that
are generally homogenous, heavy in weight, and less subject to depreciation as they wait
in transit. Hence, while such products may be expensive to transport as shown by the
large elasticity for distance in these industries, these inherent features mean that they
may take more time in transit, making firms operating in these industries less concerned
with speed. Further, the base products used in the metal and chemical industries are
often derived from countries that are abundant in those resources, hence the range of
parent firms’ trade activities may be limited to countries with these resources, giving
parent firms limited opportunities to be concerned about locating affiliates elsewhere.
1.5.4 Logistics Quality as a Measure of Timeliness
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 present estimation results that are similar to those presented
in Tables 1.3 and 1.5 but use the logistic performance index recoded to make inter-
pretation of the coefficients consistent with the previous measures of timeliness as an
alternative measure of timeliness as discussed in section 1.4.2. Table 1.6 shows the
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relationship between the overall quality of a country’s shipping logistics and parent
firms sales to affiliates in that country. In column (1), a 1 percent increase in the
negative perception about logistic quality in the host country decreases parent firm’s
sales to foreign affiliates in that country by 1.3 percent. For the sectoral estimates
in columns (2) through (6), we do not observe any significant effect of timeliness on
sales to affiliates in the chemical and metal industry. The magnitude of the logistics
quality coefficient is higher for the machinery and computer industry. The elasticity
of distance is also higher for the chemical industry. Comparing the coefficients of the
logistic performance index for Tables 1.6 and 1.7, they are much higher in Table 1.7,
although the expected signs and signficance level generally follows a similar pattern for
the 5 industries and aggregate manufacturing.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper uses data from the BEA on U.S. multinational firms operating in the
manufacturing industry to analyze how timeliness induces parent firms to adjust their
trade activities with affiliates located abroad, and how firms operating in different in-
dustries categorized under manufacturing respond to long shipping lags. The results
show that parent firms trade more with affiliates located in countries that ship on time.
Long shipping lags reduce parent firms’ sales to (import from) foreign affiliates. At the
sectoral level, there is substantial heterogeneity in the response to delays. When parent
firms are ranked on a spectrum of time sensitivity, those operating in computers and
machinery are shown to be the more time sensitive, with coefficients that surpass that of
other industries. Those operating in metals and chemicals appear less sensitive to time,
although results for the metal industry are not consistent across all estimates. The re-
sults remain robust to changes in different measures of timeliness, integration activities
between parent firms and affiliates, estimation strategy and addition of other controls.
Overall, the results suggest that trade infrastructure is important for integration activ-
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ities between parent firms and their affiliates. Countries that focus on reducing lengthy
shipping lags and building infrastructure that promotes the efficient and fast movement
of goods across borders are not only promoting trade but more subtly, improving their
participation in the global production networks in manufacturing.
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1.7 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Sales by U.S. Parent Firms to Affiliates by Industry and Region (%)
Industry Mexico Africa Asia and Pacific Canada Europe Western Hemis. Middle East
Chemicals 4.81 0.90 20.59 7.91 51.86 12.00 1.93
Metals 2.49 0.72 17.01 12.36 58.55 8.51 0.36
Machinery - - - 5.25 56.22 8.87 1.28
Electronics 3.87 0.05 49.26 1.89 41.03 6.29 1.47
Electrical Equipment - 0.67 17.96 6.68 - - -
Total Manufacturing 5.17 0.91 24.54 11.30 44.74 11.35 1.98
Note: ”-” means that calculation could not be performed because the data are not available or are
suppressed to avoid disclosure of data by individual companies. In that instance, the sum of the
shares for each industry across regions do not add up to 100. Source: Authors’ calculation using
data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.The Data is for 2006.
Table 1.2: Export Time and Import from Foreign Affiliates
VARIABLES Total Chemicals Metals Machinery Computers Electricals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Timeliness -3.046*** -0.265 0.200 -3.221*** -2.317*** -2.121***
(0.720) (0.708) (0.260) (0.446) (0.763) (0.404)
Wage Rate -1.025** -0.479 0.140 -0.250 -2.424*** -1.035**
(0.490) (0.593) (0.228) (0.254) (0.587) (0.443)
Market Size 0.877*** 0.805** 1.678*** 1.327*** 1.091*** 2.084***
(0.230) (0.359) (0.118) (0.215) (0.372) (0.187)
Distance -1.972*** -1.706*** -1.897*** -1.235*** -0.670** -0.603***
(0.184) (0.353) (0.708) (0.172) (0.330) (0.204)
Land Size -0.127 0.007 0.184 -0.113 -0.482* -0.311**
(0.140) (0.140) (0.134) (0.091) (0.266) (0.120)
Observations 76 71 65 83 62 47
Log Likelihood -158.301 -150.090 -90.673 -155.023 -137.325 -71.411
R-square 0.101 0.138 0.344 0.210 0.0898 0.328
Note: Timeliness is measured as host country’s days required to export. Marginal
effects are evaluated at sample mean and pseudo R-square values are reported.
All regressions include year and host country fixed effects that are not reported.
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicates significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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Table 1.3: Export Time and Import from Foreign Affiliates
VARIABLES Total Chemicals Metals Machinery Computers Electricals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Timeliness -2.420*** -0.296 0.143 -2.638*** -1.926* -0.180***
(0.676) (0.390) (0.278) (0.494) (1.150) (0.038)
Wage Rate -1.239** -0.747 0.299 -0.318 -2.881*** 0.060
(0.497) (0.607) (0.249) (0.308) (0.688) (0.710)
Market Size 1.064*** 0.452 1.610*** 1.478*** 1.287*** 1.934***
(0.222) (0.282) (0.137) (0.182) (0.439) (0.216)
Distance -0.031 -2.062*** -1.797** -0.796*** -0.833 0.360
(0.524) (0.435) (0.700) (0.296) (0.540) (0.306)
Land Size -0.133 -0.079 -0.200* -0.267** -0.424* -0.529***
(0.150) (0.144) (0.118) (0.119) (0.218) (0.105)
Linguistic Ties 0.080 1.434*** 0.175 0.569 -0.303 1.908**
(0.553) (0.536) (0.459) (0.517) (1.023) (0.892)
FTA Agreement 0.262 3.042*** 1.029*** -0.114 -1.143 0.528
(0.692) (1.135) (0.382) (0.500) (1.211) (0.451)
Legal Strength 0.354** -0.059 0.050 0.180 0.372 0.387**
(0.137) (0.154) (0.099) (0.132) (0.253) (0.167)
Observations 76 71 65 83 62 47
Log Likelihood -152.208 -141.251 -88.255 -155.145 -134.132 -69.957
R-square 0.132 0.189 0.362 0.209 0.111 0.386
Note: Timeliness is measured as host country’s days required to export. Marginal
effects are evaluated at sample mean and pseudo R-square values are reported.
All regressions include year and host country fixed effects that are not reported.
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicates significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Table 1.4: Import Time and Sales to Foreign Affiliates
VARIABLES Total Chemicals Metals Machinery Computers Electricals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Timeliness -1.082*** -0.098 -0.375 -1.672*** -2.400*** -1.385**
(0.266) (0.629) (0.669) (0.400) (0.466) (0.602)
Wage Rate 0.179 -0.117 -0.851*** -0.774** -1.086*** -0.443
(0.199) (0.389) (0.265) (0.363) (0.362) (0.362)
Market Size 1.071*** 0.722*** 1.763*** 1.200*** 0.799*** 1.268***
(0.094) (0.184) (0.152) (0.168) (0.280) (0.255)
Distance -0.339* -0.838*** -0.301 -0.188 -0.416 -0.683*
(0.204) (0.256) (0.250) (0.171) (0.455) (0.360)
Land Size -0.097 -0.111 -0.055 -0.127* -0.461*** -0.473**
(0.065) (0.094) (0.092) (0.074) (0.141) (0.188)
Observations 90 78 65 81 71 69
Log Likelihood -122.819 -139.517 -99.615 -134.093 -157.013 -137.227
R-Square 0.372 0.223 0.317 0.301 0.0864 0.158
Note: Timeliness is measured as host country’s days required to import. Marginal
effects are evaluated at sample mean and pseudo R-square values are reported.
All regressions include year and host country fixed effects that are not reported.
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicates significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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Table 1.5: Import Time and Sales to Foreign Affiliates
VARIABLES Total Chemicals Metals Machinery Computers Electricals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Timeliness -0.736*** -0.525* 0.111 -1.172*** -2.403*** -0.568**
(0.236) (0.264) (0.637) (0.296) (0.819) (0.257)
Wage Rate -0.052 -0.758* -1.132*** -1.077*** 1.500 -2.015***
(0.286) (0.442) (0.337) (0.370) (0.944) (0.525)
Market Size 0.978*** 0.461** 1.855*** 1.144*** 0.566 1.147***
(0.132) (0.196) (0.186) (0.174) (0.379) (0.249)
Distance -0.463** -1.231** -0.483 -0.047 -0.312 -0.467
(0.201) (0.484) (0.299) (0.235) (0.365) (0.418)
Land Size -0.140** -0.271** 0.008 -0.234*** -0.813*** -0.458***
(0.066) (0.121) (0.137) (0.085) (0.154) (0.146)
Linguistic Ties 0.560* 2.634*** 0.019 0.345 1.090 2.385***
(0.322) (0.707) (0.652) (0.413) (0.990) (0.657)
FTA Agreement -0.862*** -0.879* -0.320 -0.027 -2.719*** -1.995**
(0.291) (0.457) (0.380) (0.251) (0.880) (0.977)
Tariffs 0.004 -0.149 0.011 -0.130 0.764 0.613**
(0.127) (0.280) (0.266) (0.269) (0.549) (0.285)
Legal Strength 0.105 -0.414*** 0.151 0.025 0.239 0.044
(0.099) (0.144) (0.144) (0.109) (0.254) (0.140)
Observations 80 74 59 75 62 62
Log Likelihood -97.201 -120.344 -86.899 -116.786 -129.415 -107.105
R-Square 0.448 0.300 0.348 0.340 0.147 0.280
Note: Timeliness is measured as host country’s days required to import. Marginal
effects are evaluated at sample mean and pseudo R-square values are reported. All
regressions include year fixed and host country fixed effects that are not reported.
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicates significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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Table 1.6: Logistics Quality and Sales to Foreign Affiliates
VARIABLES Total Chemicals Metals Machinery Computers Electricals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logistics Quality -1.259*** -0.706 -1.217 -1.955*** -1.786*** -1.232**
(0.342) (0.592) (0.891) (0.512) (0.498) (0.589)
Wage Rate 0.110 -1.725** -0.631 -0.930*** 1.417 -2.226***
(0.289) (0.783) (0.593) (0.324) (0.951) (0.543)
Market Size 0.887*** -0.022 0.947** 1.118*** 0.649* 1.193***
(0.134) (0.280) (0.392) (0.159) (0.348) (0.249)
Distance -0.448*** -1.066* -0.545 0.072 -0.804 -0.540
(0.166) (0.544) (0.408) (0.220) (0.505) (0.424)
Land Size -0.115** -0.277 0.587** -0.221** -0.833*** -0.521***
(0.057) (0.231) (0.239) (0.088) (0.162) (0.140)
Linguistic Ties 0.507 2.669** 0.080 0.014 1.120 2.452***
(0.309) (1.255) (0.769) (0.389) (1.022) (0.667)
FTA -0.848*** -1.152** 0.665 0.102 -2.392*** -2.077**
(0.269) (0.560) (0.551) (0.324) (0.891) (0.990)
Tariff 0.080 0.030 0.129 0.025 0.290 0.510*
(0.109) (0.536) (0.342) (0.256) (0.531) (0.285)
Legal Strength 0.079 -0.505* 0.071 0.026 0.264 0.116
(0.096) (0.271) (0.190) (0.092) (0.265) (0.145)
Observations 80 74 59 75 62 62
Log Likelihood -94.251 -153.992 -121.973 -113.272 -132.249 -106.650
R-square 0.465 0.104 0.0854 0.360 0.129 0.283
Note: Marginal effects are evaluated at sample mean and pseudo R-square values
are reported. All regressions include year and host country fixed effects that are
not reported. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicates
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Table 1.7: Logistics Quality and Import from Foreign Affiliates
VARIABLES Total Chemicals Metals Machinery Computers Electricals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logistics Quality -3.108*** -0.414 0.218 -4.773*** -4.278*** -2.866***
(0.650) (0.658) (0.397) (0.838) (1.008) (0.653)
Wage Rate -1.275*** -0.122 0.266 0.225 -2.925*** 0.088
(0.452) (0.583) (0.277) (0.237) (0.700) (0.660)
Market Size 0.902*** 0.172 1.620*** 1.342*** 1.074** 1.569***
(0.207) (0.300) (0.139) (0.185) (0.429) (0.275)
lgdist -0.585 -1.975*** -1.526** -0.876*** -1.693** -0.797***
(0.529) (0.414) (0.643) (0.277) (0.744) (0.219)
Land Size -0.024 -0.015 0.214 -0.029 -0.450 -0.559***
(0.124) (0.132) (0.147) (0.099) (0.275) (0.094)
Linguistic Ties 0.118 1.531*** 0.266 0.194 -0.496 2.090***
(0.534) (0.548) (0.423) (0.491) (1.016) (0.554)
FTA -0.047 -2.489** -1.009** -0.401 -0.893 0.860*
(0.733) (1.041) (0.424) (0.604) (1.286) (0.510)
Legal Strength 0.373*** -0.208 0.043 0.071 0.325 -0.172
(0.131) (0.161) (0.092) (0.093) (0.235) (0.153)
Observations 76 71 65 83 62 47
Log Likelihood -146.814 -137.967 -88.212 -141.915 -134.605 -71.119
R-square 0.163 0.208 0.362 0.277 0.108 0.331
Note: Marginal effects are evaluated at sample mean and pseudo R-square values
are reported. All regressions include year and host country fixed effects that are
not reported. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicates
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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Table 1.8: List of Host Countries
Argentina(ARG) Italy(ITA)
Australia(AUS) Japan(JPN)
Austria (AUT) Korea, Rep.(KOR)
Barbados(BRB) Luxembourg(LUX)
Belgium (BEL) Malaysia(MYS)
Bermuda (BMU) Mexico (MEX)
Brazil (BRA) Netherlands(NLD)
Canada (CAN) New Zealand(NZL)
Chile (CHL) Nigeria (NGA)




Denmark (DNK) Poland (POL)
Dominican Republic(DOM) Portugal(PRT)
Ecuador (ECU) Russian Federation(RUS)
Egypt, Arab Rep.(EGY) Saudi Arabia(SAU)
Finland (FIN) Singapore(SGP)
France (FRA) South Africa(ZAF)
Germany (DEU) Spain (ESP)
Greece (GRC) Sweden (SWE)
Honduras(HND) Switzerland(CHE )
Hong Kong SAR, China(HKG) Thailand(THA)
Hungary (HUN) Turkey(TUR)
India (IND) United Arab Emirates(ARE)
Indonesia(IDN) United Kingdom(GBR)
Ireland (IRL) Venezuela, RB(VEN)
Israel (ISR)
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Chapter 2
Market Access for South vs. North:
A Product Level Investigation
2.1 Introduction
One of the most contentious issue in multilateral trade negotiations is the effect
of trade costs on market access for developing countries. After the success of the
Uruguay round in lowering tariff barriers around the world, the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) issued a report entitled “Market Access: Unfinished Business-Post
Uruguay Round Inventory and Issues” in 2001, that evaluated and clarified ongoing
trade negotiations in the market access area, but trade negations since the WTO Min-
isterial Conference of 2003 in Cancùn have failed to yield a general consensus. The so
called “North-South divide,” is often cited as part of the failure of these trade nego-
tiations. China, India, Brazil, and South Africa continue to press for better market
access terms for South exporters, arguing that the Common Agricultural Policy of the
EU and the U.S. agro-subsidies do not favor the market access success of exporters in
developing countries.
As multilateral trade talks continue at the policy front, empirical research in interna-
tional trade has gained momentum in the analysis of the effects of trade frictions on the
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extensive and intensive margins of export (Tarasov, 2012; Buono and Lalanne, 2012).
One issue that has received very little attention in the literature is whether the effects
of market access barriers as observed in the data are different for South and North
exporters accessing the same destination market. In a recent paper, Waugh (2010)
argue that to reconcile bilateral export and price data across countries, trade frictions
for South vs. North countries must be systematically different, with poor countries
consistently facing higher frictions than rich countries. In this paper, we search the
data for the presence of any such systematic development related bias, where South ex-
porters face higher market access friction relative to North exporters. We use detailed
differentiated product level data for 144 commodities and 127 countries, and construct
observable measures of trade cost that capture both fixed and variable costs of export.
To empirically test this hypothesis, we employ a heterogeneous firms trade model
developed by Helpman et al. (2008) that has some advantages suited for that purpose.
First, we are able to embed fixed and variable trade costs in the model and test for their
effects on the extensive and intensive margins of export using a two-step estimation
framework. In the first stage, both fixed and variable costs affect firm’s success in
entering export markets and upon successful entry, variable cost affects their export
volume in the second stage (since firms incur fixed cost in their decision to enter the
market only). Secondly, the model allows us to account for the effect of the fraction of
firms that export in each market, which is especially important when comparing South
and North exporters. Even in developed markets, few firms are known to engage in
international trade (Bernard et al., 2007), and the fraction of exporters is much likely
to be lower in developing countries. Finally, the model allows us to control for sample
selection bias that may influence our results when only non-zero trade observations
are used in estimating the effect of trade cost on export volume. If in fact zero trade
volume is a result of observable features of either the importing or exporting country,
it is important to account for the bias they cause when only positive observations are
used in the estimation.
Chapter 2. Market Access for South vs. North: A Product Level Investigation 27
The results show that at the extensive margin, where we compare the effects of
observable fixed and variable costs on the probability of success in entering export
markets, South exporters appear to face higher costs of export relative to North ex-
porters although the difference in cost for South vs. North is not quite substantial.
However, at the intensive margin, where we examine the effect of observable variable
cost on the export volume of South exporters who successfully penetrate export market
we find substantial South-North bias with coefficients of cost differences for South vs.
North variable costs ranging from -0.429 and -0.421 at the disaggregate level and -0.367
and -0.382 at the aggregate level.
This paper contributes to a growing empirical literature on market access and trade
frictions. It is closely related to the work of Waugh (2010), who uses a general equi-
librium model in the spirit of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to analyze how income levels
affect trade costs. He finds that trade costs are negatively related to a country’s de-
velopment level, such that poor countries face higher market access friction relative to
rich countries. Using a model of economic geography, Redding and Venables (2004)
argue that the geography of market access plays an important role in explaining cross-
country difference in income. Very distant countries pay higher export costs as well
as higher import costs for input and capital equipment. Hence firms located in these
countries pay relatively lower wages, leading to lower living standards. However, unlike
Waugh (2010), we use data on the export cost per unit and the number of procedures
to register a property to capture variable and fixed costs of export, we also use detailed
differentiated product level data for 144 commodities that may be more consistent with
models of heterogeneous firms.
The paper also provides some support for the literature on the fixed costs of trade.
Both theoretical and empirical studies have documented the importance of fixed costs of
trade in successfully entering export markets. In the now-classical Melitz (2003) model,
the most productive firms which are able to sink initial entry costs enter export markets;
less productive firms produce domestically, while the least productive firms exit the
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market. Clerides et al. (1998) and Das et al. (2007) show that firms are concerned
about export costs that are fixed in nature in addition to per unit cost. Firms decide
to sink an initial investment to enter export markets today only if expected future profit
will be able to cover these costs. In their estimation for Columbian firms, entry costs are
larger for smaller producers than for larger producers. Fixed costs include the resources
used in forming distributive and sales networks, maintaining warehouses, information
flows, and establishing legal contracts with economic agents such as suppliers and
government officials. While these findings demonstrate the importance of fixed costs
for market entry, rarely do gravity models account for such costs. We rely on recent
data on trade cost available across countries to investigate the effect of fixed costs on
export market participations.1
Finally, our paper is also related to the recent literature on zero trade. It is well
noted that zero observations are highly present in developing countries export. Aside
the problem of sample selection bias, gravity models that use only positive trade are
not able to account for the extensive margin of export. Thus the coefficient on distance
or any other measures of trade cost only captures shipping cost. Exception includes
Baldwin and Harrigan (2011). Using disaggregated US bilateral data and a modified
version of the Melitz (2003) models that incorporate preference for quality, they exam-
ined how importer’s market size and bilateral distance explains the spatial patterns of
zeros in bilateral trade data. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Eaton et al. (2011) argue
that while zero trade may not affect estimation of bilateral trade for large economies
within broad sectors, zeros are quite common between smaller countries.
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the HMR model
that yields our two-stage estimation framework for estimating our export participation
1Das et al. (2007) consider distribution channels, learning bureaucratic procedures, adaptation of
products and packages for foreign markets, monitoring foreign custom procedures, and local product
standards. In addition, social network and transnational business promotes international trade by
removing barriers of contract enforcement and providing information about trading opportunities
(e.g., Rauch (2001)). Intermediaries are also important in foreign firms entering markets that are
more difficult to penetrate Ahn et al. (2011).
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and trade flow equation. Section 3 provides an in-depth discussion of our trade flow
data and North-South classification as well our various measures of fixed and variable
costs. Section 4 presents the empirical results of our estimates from both aggregate and
commodity level data and discussion of our results. Section 5 presents some sensitivity
checks and section 6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
To perform our empirical estimation, we use a version of the gravity equation derived
form a heterogeneous firms trade model proposed by Helpman et al. (2008). The model
yields a two stage-estimation framework in which trade costs determine market access
in the first stage (intensive margin) and upon successful entry trade cost determines
the effect on export volume.
Consider a set of N countries indexed by i, j = 1, 2, ..., N , with Nc firms in each
country i. There are several product categories, but each firm c produces one variety
within a given category. For notational simplicity, we suppress the product index but
all the theoretical development applies to each product. In country i consumers have








Here, qi(θ) is i
′s consumption of variety θ, βi is the mass of varieties available for
consumption and α determines the elasticity of substitution across varieties such that





where pi is the price of variety θ, Yi is real income, and Pi is the average price in country
i over all varieties in set βi.
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In country j, each firm produces one unit of output using a Ricardian technology
with unit cost cj/aj, where 1/aj is firm-specific productivity measure such that a higher
value of 1/aj indicates higher productivity for the firm and cj is country-specific cost of
production per unit. We assume that aj is drawn from a Pareto distribution of the form
G(aj) = (a
k
j − akLJ)/(akHj − akLJ) where k > ε− 1. G(aj) has a country-specific support
of [aLj, aHj] such that aHj > aLj > 0. When a firm in country j sells its product to
consumers in i, it incurs a fixed cost of export fij > 0 and variable transport cost
τij > 1. Hence, a monopolistic competitive firm in j would choose a mark-up price
pij(θ) = (τijcja)/aj which is adjusted for transport cost. Hence, a firms in j with
productivity level aj that succeeds in serving a foreign market i would have a profit
function of the form:





Yi − fij (2.1)
2.2.1 First Stage Estimation: Extensive Margin
Since the Melitz (2003) model predicts systematic self-selection of firms into export
market based on firms’ specific productivity measures (1/aj), export to i from j would
depend only on the most productive firms in j. Consider two monopolistic competitive
firms such as Apple and Dell that attempt to penetrate the export market in Burkina
Faso and Ghana. Assuming the most product firm is Apple, it would export to Ghana
if it is able to obtain a positive profit as specified in equation (2.1). However, to
serve the market in Burkina Faso, Apple has to incur significant transport cost to
reach the landlocked country, where it has to incur further fixed costs to establish
distribution networks and warehouses. If Apple, the most productive firm, fails to
enter the computer market in Burkina Faso, then Dell, the second most productive
firm, would also fail to enter the market in Burkina Faso. Thus, for the most productive
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firm whose productivity is given by (aLj) we can define a variable:









This is the ratio of variable profit from export to the fixed cost of export for the most
productive firm exporting from j to i. We define Tij = 1 if there is positive profit
from exporting for the most productive firm such that zij(aLj) = ln[Zij(aLj)] > 0, and
Tij = 0 if this firm fails to enter country i
′s market. We define fixed cost for exporting
as:
ln(fij) = λ0 + λ1ln(FCi) + λ2ln(FCi) + λi + λj − vij (2.3)
where ln(FCi) and ln(FCj) are the importer’s and exporter’s fixed costs of import and
export respectively that are observable, λi and λj are country specific fixed costs for
exporting and vij is a disturbance term. Further we define variable cost as:
(ε− 1)ln(τij) = γ0 + γ1ln(dij) + γ2ln(V Ci) + γ3ln(V Cj) + γi + γj − uij (2.4)
where dij is bilateral distance, V Ci and V Cj are importer and exporter freight handling
costs respectively, and γi and γj are the remaining country-specific variable costs of
trade. Using equation (2.2) and summing up FC (fixed cost) and VC (variable cost)
for i and j, we can specific a linear probability model:
Pij = P (Tij = 1|ln(FCij), , ln(dij), ln(V Cij), ηi, ηj, ηij) (2.5)
where ηij = ln(1 − α) − (1 − ε)ln(α) − λ0 − γ0, ηj = (1 − ε)ln(cj) − λj − γj and
ηi = (ε− 1)ln(Pi) + ln(Yi)− λi − γi.
Since our interest is in how fixed and variable costs affect firms’ successfulness in en-
tering export markets, and whether there is any systematic bias for South export to
North markets, we augment equation (2.5) by interacting trade costs measures with
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South-North (SN) dummies as follows:
Pij = P (Tij =1|ln(FCij), ln(FCij) ∗ SN, ln(dij), ln(dij) ∗ SN, ln(V Cij),
ln(V Cij) ∗ SN, ηi, ηj, ηij)
(2.6)
Note that equation 2.6 depends only on the market access decision of the most pro-
ductive firm. Fixed and variable costs for trade are primary factors of the probability
of successful entry into a foreign market after controlling for exporter (ηj) and importer
(ηi) fixed effects that capture the market size, the most productive firms’ productivity
levels, unit production costs, and the average price in importing country i. The linear
probability model (LPM) in equation (2.6) represents our first stage estimation equa-
tion. It estimates the effect of both fixed and variable trade costs on the probability
of entry into export markets. If there is no systematic bias between South and North,
we expect the elasticity of trade costs to be identical for both North and South after
controlling for exporter and importer fixed effects. Helpman et al. (2008) use the probit
model; However to avoid the incidental parameter problem that prevents us from in-
cluding the South and North fixed effect dummies, we use the LPM estimation strategy
following Baldwin and Harrigan (2011).
2.2.2 Second Stage Estimation: Intensive Margin
Helpman et al. (2008) point out that the conventional gravity equation as specified
by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) does not account for the fraction of firms that
actually export from country j to i. However, as the Melitz (2003) model specifies,
only a fraction of firms in country j that are productive enough to have positive profits
in country i′s exports. The cutoff productivity level is defined by setting πij(aij) = 0.
As long as firm’s productivity is higher than its cutoff one (aij > aj), exporters from j
have positive profit in country i. We therefore express the bilateral volume of export
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Wij, and Wij = {maxZ(k−ε+1)/(ε−1)ij − 1, 0}.
The predicted probability of success is obtained from estimating equation (2.6).2
Using the predicted values, Helpman et al. (2008) show that we can construct ŵ∗ij =
ln{exp[δ(ẑ∗ij+η̂∗ij)]−1} and βuvη̂∗ij (η̂∗ij is the inverse mills ratio) that respectively control
for unobserved firm heterogeneity and sample selection bias in a gravity equation that
estimates the effect of trade costs on bilateral trade flows. To get around the problem
of convergence for 144 commodities when using nonlinear least squares, we use the δ
values from Helpman et al. (2008) and estimate our second stage by OLS. Hence we can
obtain a consistent second stage estimation that captures the effect of variable trade
costs on bilateral trade volume from equation 2.7 as follows:
Mij =β0 − γ1ln(dij)− γ2ln(dij) ∗ SN − γ3ln(V Cij)− γ4ln(V Cij) ∗ SN






Notice that the fixed cost variable (FCij) do not enter equation (2.8). This is because
fixed costs are borne during market access entry so that after firms enter the market,
the only concern for firm is the variable cost of export.
2.3 The Data
2.3.1 Overview
Consistent with a model of heterogeneous firms’ trade in differentiated products,
we follow Rauch (1999) and use differentiated products for our empirical estimation.
We extract bilateral import data from the UN Comtrade at the 3-digit of the Standard
2Where the predicted value is greater than 1, we replace it with 0.9999 and where it is less than 0,
we replace it with 0.0001
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International Trade Classification (SITC) revision 3.3 We filter our dataset to include
commodities for which a reporter imports from at least one partner. This eliminates the
problem of including commodities for which no positive trade value is observed in the
entire sample. We have 2,304,288 potential bilateral trade observations from a sample
that consists of 144 products for 127 countries in the year 2006. 1,610,387 (70%) of
these possible observations are zero. This highlights the high presence of zeros in trade
data at a detailed level of product disaggregation. The proportion of zeros trade is
even higher for exporters in South countries. For S-N (South export to North) sample,
we have 580,608 potential trade pairs, of which 461,855 (80%) are zeros, whereas our
N-N (North countries export to other North countries) sample has 580,608 potential
observations for which 260,553 (45%) have zero values.4
2.3.2 Fixed and Variable Costs of Trade
For each bilateral pair, we construct corresponding measures of trade costs that
allow us to capture the effects of variable and fixed trade costs on market access and
export volume. First, as standard in the gravity equation, we use distance to capture
transport cost. We construct a measure of variable cost of export using the additive
values of the importers’ import cost per/20-footer containers and the corresponding
exporters’ export cost per/20 footer container. These cost measures capture the within
border variable costs to ship a container, such as port charges, the resources required for
3Import data are argued to be more precise in the data than export data due to the need for
governments to inspect imported products for tariffs and import duties and for contrabands. See
Tarasov (2012) and Felbermayr and Kohler (2006)
4UN Comtrade does not provide any means of verifying whether missing data are genuinely zero
or not reported but simply treat unreported data as missing. Felbermayr and Kohler (2006) argue
that about 80% of all missing data in trade data are truly missing. However, the usual caveat that
missing data may not be truly zero applies. Some countries report positive trade only when export
of a particular commodity is above a given cutoff value. In compiling monthly merchandise trade,
export cutoff value was $2,500 for the United States in 1992 and shippers export declaration are not
required for transactions of less than that amount Kester (1992). However, restricting our sample to
a case where at least a partner import from one market necessitates that the product is produced in
the exporting country.
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preparing and storing cargo and the loading and unloading of cargo. They vary with the
volume of export and would likely influence the probability of success in entering export
markets as well as the trade volume upon successful entering into a particular market.
Next, we use the additive values of the exporters’ and importers’ cost of business start-
up to measure the fixed costs of export. These measures include the resources spent
on administrative and regulation procedures that do not vary with export volume,
establishing distributive and contract networks, and following legal requirements in
both the importing and exporting countries. Fixed costs are non-trivial and are not
correlated with variable costs and most importantly bilateral distance. They pose
barriers to market access because they influence the costs that firms have to incur
both home and abroad in order to serve foreign markets. For sensitivity analysis, we
also use the additive values of the procedures to register a property for the exporter
and importer as a measure of fixed cost. These data are obtained from the World
Development Indicators (WDI, 2011).
2.3.3 Other Covariates
As conventional in gravity models, we add other variables that influence market
access and trade volume. Unless otherwise stated, the rest of the data are obtained
from Head et al. (2010) CEPII bilateral trade database. Common border is a binary
variable equal to 1 when the two countries share a similar border and 0 otherwise. It
captures the effect of contiguity on trade volume and market access. Legal origin is a
dummy variable defined as 0 when the two countries have dissimilar legal systems and 1
when they have similar legal origin. In effect, it captures the effect of legal similarities
on trade volume and partnership. To capture the effects of communication barriers
and colonial linkages on trade volume and partnership, we use common language and
common colonizer variables that equals to 1 when the two countries respectively have
linguistic or colonial ties and 0 otherwise. Finally regional trade agreement (RTA) is
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a dummy variable defined as 1 when the two countries belong to the same regional
trade agreement and 0 otherwise. It measures the effect of regional trade agreements
on bilateral trade volume and partnership.
2.3.4 Summary of North and South Classification and Trade
Costs
For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we first rank the countries in our dataset
based on income per capita and divide the sample into two (we later experiment with
other definitions of South and North). The median income in our sample is $8977.
Countries with income per capita from the median upwards are classified as North
otherwise they are considered as South. Since our primary interest is in comparing
the effect of trade costs on market access and export volume for South against North,
we consider exporting to the same destination market. We generate a binary variable
equal to 1 when South is exporting to North and zero otherwise. Table 2.1 reports
the composition of countries in North and South together with their average GDP per
capita. The average income for North is $25,179 and that for South is $3,428. Sub-
Saharan Africa forms the highest share of South exporters (0.38) followed by countries
in the Western Hemisphere (0.25) and Asia (0.22). For North, countries in Europe forms
the highest share (0.52) followed by the Western Hemisphere (0.16) and the countries
of Middle East and North Africa (0.14). The list of South and North countries are
presented in Table 2.8. Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics of the dat used to
construct our trade cost measures. The average bilateral distance for S-N is 7872km
and for N-N is 6705km. The average cost of export and import per container is $955 and
$1025 respectively for North and that of South is $1260 and $1511 respectively. The
average number of procedures to register a property in the North are 6 and 10 for North
and South respectively. This can possibly be explained by the monetary and security
incentives to inspect imported cargo for taxes, tariffs and contraband materials.
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Using the data for all 127 countries in our sample, Figure 2.1 plots the log of export
costs against the log of GDP per capita. We observe an inverse relationship between
a country’s development stage and costs for exporting. High income countries such
as Finland (FIN), Norway (NOR), and Singapore (SGP) are clustered at the lower
right corners, whereas low income countries such as Central African Republic (CAF),
Rwanda (RWA), and Niger (NER) are clustered at the upper left corners. The data
suggest that South appears to face higher trade cost relative to North. Figure 3.1
shows a similar negative relationship between the cost of business start-up and GDP
per capita. In the next section examine whether the effects of these costs on market
access and export volume are quantitatively different for South and North.
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Aggregate Results: Export Markets and Export Volume
This section presents our first and second stage estimation results for our total sam-
ple. Column (1) of Table 2.3 presents the first-stage (extensive margin) estimates from
the linear probability model of the effect of trade costs on the probability of success
in entering export markets, augmented by the various control variables presented in
section 2.3. We observe negative coefficients on our measures of trade costs: distance,
variable cost and the cost of business startup. These coefficients are statistical signifi-
cance at 1 percent. Hence the probability that a firm will successfully enter an export
market is decreasing with rising variable cost, business start-up cost and distance. A
1 percent increase in distance decreases the probability that country j would import
from i by about 0.12 percent. For variable cost, the decrease is by about 0.16 percent
and 0.03 percent for fixed cost as measured by the cost of business startup.
However there is an added cost when a South country is exporting to a North market.
When trade cost measures are interacted with a South-North dummy, all coefficients are
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negative and statistically significant at 1 percent. When distance is interacted with a SN
dummy, the coefficient on the interaction term is -0.011. This means that when a South
country is entering an export market in North, the probability of success decreases
by 0.01 percent. The total effect of distance therefore becomes −0.120 − 0.011 =
−0.131. For variable and fixed costs of export, the probability of successful entry into
an export market for South-North decreases by 0.002 and 0.007 respectively. For the
other covariates, we observe positive coefficients that are significant at 1 percent. The
probability of successful entry into export market increases when the two countries
have a common legal system, share a common border, have had a colonial relationship,
have similar linguistic ties and belong to the same regional trade agreement.
Turning to our second stage estimation, column (2) presents the second stage re-
sults (intensive margin). The coefficients represent the effect of trade costs on export
volume (the intensive margin). Since we exclude the costs of business startup (fixed
costs), we do not invoke any further exclusion restrictions as required by the two stage
estimation framework.5 Here, we pause to take note of the importance of unobserved
firm heterogeneity on export volume. We observe a positive relationship between ex-
port volume and the fraction of firms that engage in export in the exporting country.
A 1 percent increase in the fraction of exporters in the exporting country increases
export volume by about 3 percent. Hence trade volume increase as the percentage of
firms that export increases.
At the extensive margin, distance and variable cost have a negative effect of export
volume. A 1 percent increase in distance decreases export volume by 1.5 percent. We
also observe a negative correlation between variable cost and export volume. A 1 per-
cent increase in variable cost decreases export volume by 0.28 percent. The coefficients
on distance and variable cost are both significant at the 1 percent level. For the other
explanatory variables, trade volume between ij increases when both countries belong
5Firms incur fixed cost when they decide to enter the export market in the first stage. After
successful entry, only variable costs and distance matters.
Chapter 2. Market Access for South vs. North: A Product Level Investigation 39
to the same regional trade agreement, when they share a similar border, have had a
colonial relationship in the past, have the same legal system, and have linguistic simi-
larities. All the covariates are significant at 1 percent.
Finally, the coefficients on the interaction terms are negative but not significant
for variable cost. When South is exporting to North, the negative effect of distance is
-0.282. This indicates that a 1 percent increase in distance decreases the export volume
when a South exporter is exporting to a North market. Again, the combined effect of
distance is −1.478 − 0.282 = −1.76. For variable cost, trade volume decreases by 0.4
percent when South exports to North for a 1 percent increase in distance although the
coefficient is not statistically significant. When South North dummies are interacted
with the variable cost of export, we obtain a negative and statistically significant effect
on the interaction term. When South is exporting to North, trade cost increases by
about 0.4 percent. This suggests that at the extensive margin, South exporters face
higher variable cost relative to North exporters. Next we turn to the estimation results
for the product level.
2.4.2 First Stage Product Level Results: Extensive Margin
We repeat our first stage estimation by exploiting variation across products. Again,
the coefficients measure the effect of trade cost on market access. The estimation is
performed product by product, controlling for importer and exporter fixed effects and
including the standard controls with robust standard errors clustered around country
pairs. Since we have regression results for 144 products, we report the summary statis-
tics for the variables of interest only. The results are presented in Table 2.4. Column (1)
presents the median trade costs coefficients for all 144 product level estimations. Col-
umn (2) presents the standard deviation, and Columns (3) and (4) report the maximum
and minimum coefficients respectively. Column (5) reports the number of coefficients
that match our expected signs (negative for all measures of trade cost) and column 6
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shows the fraction of correctly matched signs (-) that are statistically significant at 5
percent.
The median elasticity for distance is -0.135 whereas the maximum is 0.025 and the
minimum is -0.054. All 144 coefficients on distance have the expected signs and are
significant at least at the 5 percent level. Hence distance overall has a negative effect on
the probability of success for firm’s export. Interacting distance with a S-N dummy, the
magnitude of the median coefficient is positive (0.009). However, only 47 of the entire
144 estimates have interaction terms for distance and S-N dummy that are negative.
Of this 47 negative coefficients, only 6 are significant at 5 percent level. Therefore
it appears that there is no statistically significant difference in the effect of distance
on export volume when South is exporting to North. Considering the coefficients for
variable cost, the median is -0.166, suggesting an overall negative effect of variable cost
on trade partnership. When variable cost is interacted with SN dummies, the median
coefficient is -0.011 with more than half of the estimates (89) having negative coefficients
of which 47 reaches conventional statistical significance. The total effect of the variable
cost on export volume is therefore (−0.166− 0.011) = −0.177. Finally, fixed cost also
has a negative effect on the extensive margin of export, with 134 estimates having the
expected sign for the fixed cost variable (business cost) of which 105 are significant at
5 percent. The estimated median coefficient when the fixed cost is interacted with SN
dummy is -0.010 of which 99 with 62 being significant at 5 percent. Overall at the
product level, we observe negative coefficients on the interaction terms, although the
number of coefficients that are correctly signed and significant is not very substantial
(6 for distance, 47 for variable cost and 62 for business start-up cost.)
2.4.3 Second Stage Product Level Results: Export Volume
We next perform our second stage estimation using commodity level data and con-
trol for the fraction of exporters and sample selection bias as in our second stage
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aggregate model. The results are presented in table 3.6. As already noted, Columns
(3) and (4) report the maximum and minimum coefficients respectively and column
(2) shows the standard deviations. Column (5) reports the number of coefficients that
match our expected signs (negative for all measures of trade cost) and Column (6)
shows the fraction of correctly matched signs (-) that are statistically significant at 5
percent. The coefficients on distance are negative and statistically significant for all
estimates. The median coefficient of distance is -1.863. Hence at the extensive margin,
distance has a negative effect on export volume. The coefficients on the interaction
term between distance and SN dummies, are generally positive. Only 19 of the esti-
mated results have coefficients that are negative of which 2 are significant at 5 percent.
For the variable cost, the median coefficient is -0.67 of which 98 are negative with 36
being statistically significant. Thus, overall, the higher the variable cost of export be-
tween ij, the lower the export volume. Finally the interaction term between variable
cost and SN dummies have a median coefficient of -0.421 of which 136 are negatively
signed with 91 of the rightly signed coefficient being significant at 5 percent. The total
effect of variable cost on export volume is (−0.670− 0.421) = −1.091 at the intensive
margin. Hence the effect of variable cost on export volume for South-North appears to
be higher at the extensive margin.
2.5 Sensitivity Checks
To verify if the results obtained above are robust, we perform a second set of
regressions that use the sum of the number of procedures to register a property for
the exporter and importer respectively as a measure of fixed cost. The results are
reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.3. Column (3) shows the results for the
effect of trade costs on market access (extensive margin). We observe similar results
as in column (1). The probability of market access success is decreasing with distance,
fixed cost and variable cost. Most importantly, the probability that country i import
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from j decreases by 0.015 precent for a 1 percent increase in variable cost. Further,
when the fixed cost variable is interacted with the SN dummy, the coefficient indicates
that the negative effect of fixed cost on market access increases by -0.015 percent when
a South country is exporting to a North partner. Column (4) shows the second stage
estimation results of the effect of trade cost on trade volume (intensive margin). Again
the results are not very different although the coefficients are slightly higher than in the
previous estimates in column (2). Trade volume is decreasing with increasing distance,
variable cost, and fixed costs. The coefficient on the interaction term between the
variable cost and SN dummy is negative but not statistically significant. The results
confirm that at the aggregate level, trade costs have a negative effect on market access
and export volume for South.
Tables 3.5 and 3.7 show results for the second stage estimation. The estimation
results obtained are not quite different from those that uses business startup cost as
a measure of fixed cost. In table 6 the results for the extensive margin are presented
with summary statistics for the trade cost variables of interest. The median coefficient
on the variable cost is -0.004 of which 71 are negatively signed with 42 of them being
statistically significant. Interacting the average number of procedures to register a
property with SN dummy, the median coefficient suggest that overall, the probability
of market access success decreases by about 0.02 percent, when a South exporter is
exporting to a North market. In Table 3.7 the results of the effect of distance and
variable cost on the intensive margin shows that there is no significant difference in
the effect of distance on market access when South export’s to North. However the
interaction term on the variable cost suggest that for South-North trade, export volume
decreases by about 0.43 percent for a 1 percent increase in variable cost.
Finally for further sensitivity checks, we estimate another set of regression results by
dividing the entire dataset into a pooled sample, North-North (N-N) and South-North
(S-N), and compare the absolute magnitudes on the coefficients on distance, variable
costs and fixed costs for N-N and S-N. We also perform another set of estimation by
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redefining South countries to include those countries with income per capita below the
25 percentiles ($1,031) and North to include countries with income per capita above
the 75th percentile ($16,780). While the results are not reported, they are available
upon request. In all cases, while there are slight variations in estimation results, the
general pattern discussed in the data above remains representative.
2.6 Conclusion
Recent interest in international trade has focused on the effects of trade frictions
on the extensive and intensive margins of export. In this paper we present empirical
evidence on the effects of variable and fixed costs of export on the extensive and inten-
sive margins of trade for South vs. North exporters. In particular, we search for the
presence of any systematic development related bias, where South exporters face higher
market access friction relative to North exporters. At the extensive margin, when we
interact trade costs with South-North dummies and compare the effects of observable
fixed and variable costs on the probability of success in entering export markets, only
33% of the commodities under consideration have negative signs that are significant
at 5% for variable cost (shipping cost). For fixed cost (Business cost), 43% of the 144
commodities have have coefficients that are negative and 5% significant level as seen in
Table 2.4. Hence, while both fixed and variable costs matter for successful entry into
export markets, the South vs. North bias in trade costs is not quite substantial at the
extensive margin. At the intensive margin, where we examine the effect of observable
variable cost on the export volume of South exporters who successfully penetrate ex-
port market, we do not find any significant South North bias when variable costs are
interacted with South-North dummies.
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2.7 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Income and Regional Composition
of North and South
South North
Average GDP per Capita ($) 3428 25179
Share of Sub-Saharan Africa 0.38 0.06
Share of Western Hemisphere 0.25 0.16
Share of Asia 0.22 0.11
Share of Europe 0.03 0.52
Share of Middle East and North Africa 0.11 0.14
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Trade Cost Measures
North
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cost of Export per Container ($) 954 422 416 2730
Cost of Import per Container ($) 1052 453 367 2780
Cost of Business Startup (% of GNI per Capita) 12 15 0 91
Procedures to Register Property 6 3 1 14
North -North Bilateral Distance (Km) 6705 4660 132 19564
South
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cost of Export per Container ($) 1260 738 390 4581
Cost of Import per Container ($) 1512 853 430 4534
Cost of Business Startup (% of GNI per Capita) 184 791 6 6376
Procedures to Register Property 10 3 5 17
South-North Bilateral Distance (Km) 7872 3968 115 19650
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Table 2.3: Aggregate Results: Effect of Trade Costs on Market Access and Trade Flows
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance -0.120*** -1.478*** -0.121*** -1.566***
(0.003) (0.047) (0.003) (0.049)
Distance * SN -0.011*** -0.282*** -0.011*** -0.287**
(0.004) (0.037) (0.004) (0.037)
Variable Cost -0.160*** -0.352 -0.160*** -0.467
(0.022) (0.300) (0.023) (0.298)
Variable Cost *SN -0.016*** -0.367*** -0.015** -0.382***
(0.005) (0.044) (0.006) (0.044)
Business Startup Cost -0.032***
(0.003)
Business Startup Cost * SN -0.007***
(0.003)
Procedures to Trade -0.037***
(0.013)
Procedures to Trade to Trade * SN -0.015*
(0.009)
Regional Trade Agreements 0.067*** 0.498*** 0.068*** 0.537***
(0.005) (0.055) (0.006) (0.055)
Common Legal System 0.023*** 0.355*** 0.025*** 0.379***
(0.003) (0.029) (0.003) (0.029)
Colonial Relations 0.028*** 0.505*** 0.028*** 0.513***
(0.005) (0.067) (0.005) (0.067)
Common Border 0.050*** 1.064*** 0.048*** 1.106***
(0.014) (0.101) (0.014) (0.101)
Common Language 0.077*** 0.788*** 0.076*** 0.853***
(0.005) (0.053) (0.005) (0.052)
ŵ∗ij 0.904*** 0.815***
(0.090) (0.086)
βuv η̂∗ij 2.749*** 3.035***
(0.133) (0.134)
Observations 2,304,288 631,285 2,304,288 632,118
R-squared 0.468 0.357 0.468 0.359
Note: Regressions (1) and (2) use the additive values of the cost of business startup for exporter and
importer as a measure of fixed cost of trade. Regression (3) and (4) use the additive values of the
procedures to register a property the exporter and importer respectively as a measure of fixed cost
of export. Exporter and importer fixed effects are not reported. Robust standard errors clustered
around country pairs are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively.
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Table 2.4: Summary of LPM Coefficients Using 144 Products for 2006
Coefficient Median St. Dev. Max Min Sign match(-) match & 5% Sig.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance -0.135 0.025 -0.054 -0.190 144 144
Distance * SN Dummy 0.009 0.020 0.069 -0.031 47 6
Shipping Cost -0.166 0.075 0.057 -0.314 140 111
Shipping Cost * SN Dummy -0.011 0.027 0.051 -0.090 89 47
Business Cost -0.028 0.019 0.020 -0.074 134 105
Business Cost Cost * SN Dummy -0.010 0.015 0.027 -0.042 99 62
Note: The regressions use OLS estimation, we run 144 regressions for each commodity with
robust standard errors that are clustered around country pairs. All other covariates are not
reported. They include exporter and importer fixed effects, regional trade agreements, common
legal system, colonial relations, common border, common language.
Table 2.5: Summary of OLS Coefficients Using 144 Products for 2006
Coefficient Median St. Dev. Max Min Sign match(-) match & 5% Sig.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance -1.863 0.497 -0.341 -2.973 144 144
Distance * SN Dummy 0.288 0.281 0.857 -1.141 19 2
Shipping Cost -0.670 1.524 3.248 -4.894 98 36
Shipping Cost * SN Dummy -0.421 0.300 1.074 -1.108 132 91
Note: The regressions use OLS estimation, we run 144 regressions for each commodity with
robust standard errors that are clustered around country pairs. All other covariates are
not reported. They include exporter and importer fixed effects, regional trade agreements,
common legal system, colonial relations, common border, common language and controls
for firm heterogeneity and sample selection bias as in the aggregate estimation.
Table 2.6: Summary of LPM Coefficients Using 144 Products for 2006
Coefficient Median St. Dev. Max Min Sign match(-) match & 5% Sig.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance -0.136 0.0246 -0.055 -0.192 144 144
Distance * SN Dummy 0.0085 0.02 0.07 -0.032 50 7
Variable Cost -0.182 0.093 0.087 -0.344 137 107
Variable Cost * SN Dummy -0.0105 0.042 0.11 -0.138 81 36
Procedures to Trade -0.0045 0.126 0.313 -0.334 71 42
Procedures to Trade * SN Dummy -0.023 0.05 0.126 -0.166 95 47
Note: The regressions use OLS estimation, we run 144 regressions for each commodity with
robust standard errors that are clustered around country pairs. All other covariates are not
reported. They include exporter and importer fixed effects, regional trade agreements, common
legal system, colonial relations, common border, common language.
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Table 2.7: Summary of OLS Coefficients Using 144 Products for 2006
Coefficient Median St. Dev. Max Min Sign match(-) match & 5% Sig.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance -2.055 0.557 -0.199 -3.246 144 143
Distance * SN Dummy 0.300 0.288 0.846 -1.157 19 3
Variable Cost -0.8915 1.507 3.048 -4.333 105 41
Variable Cost * SN Dummy -0.429 0.305 1.099 -1.087 132 93
Note: The regressions use OLS estimation, we run 144 regressions for each commodity with
robust standard errors that are clustered around country pairs. All other covariates are
not reported. They include exporter and importer fixed effects, regional trade agreements,
common legal system, colonial relations, common border, common language and controls
for firm heterogeneity and sample selection bias as in the aggregate estimation.
Table 2.8: List of North and South Countries
North South
Argentina (ARG) Latvia (LVA) Albania (ALB) Kenya (KEN)
Australia (AUS) Lebanon (LBN) Algeria (DZA) Madagascar (MDG)
Austria (AUT) Lithuania (LTU) Bangladesh (BDG) Malawi (MWI)
Bahamas (BHS) Luxembourg (LUX) Belize (BLZ) Maldives (MDV)
Bahrain (BHR) Malaysia (MYS) Bhutan (BTN) Mali (MLI)
Belarus (BLR) Mauritius (MUS) Bolivia (BOL) Mauritania (MRT)
Belgium (BEL) Mexico (MEX) Brazil (BRA) Mongolia (MNG)
Botswana (BWA) Netherlands (NLD) Burkina Faso (BFA) Morocco (MAR)
Bulgaria (BGR) New Zealand (NZL) Cambodia (KHM) Mozambique (MOZ)
Canada (CAN) Norway (NOR) Cameroon (CMR) Namibia (NAM)
Chile (CHL) Oman (OMN) Central African Rep. (CAF) Nicaragua (NIC)
Hong Kong (HKG) Panama (PAN) China (CHN) Niger (NER)
Costa Rica (CRI) Poland (POL) Colombia (COL) Nigeria (NGA)
Croatia (HRV) Portugal (PRT) Comoros (COM) Pakistan (PAK)
Cyprus (CYP) Qatar (QAT) Cote d’Ivoire (CIV) Paraguay (PRY)
Czech Rep. (CZE) Rep. of Korea (KOR) Dominica (DMA) Peru (PER)
Denmark (DNK) Romania (ROM) Dominican Rep. (DOM) Philippines (PHL)
Estonia (EST) Russian Federation (RUS) Ecuador (ECU) Rwanda (RWA)
Finland (FIN) Saudi Arabia (SAU) Egypt, Arab Rep. (EGY) Senegal (SEN)
France (FRA) Singapore (SGP) El Salvador (SLV) Sri Lanka (LKA)
Gabon (GAB) Slovakia (SVK) Ethiopia (ETH) Sudan (SDN)
Germany (DEU) Slovenia (SVN) Fiji (FJI) Suriname (SUR)
Greece (GRC) South Africa (ZAF) Gambia (GMB) Syria (SYR)
Hungary (HUN) Spain (ESP) Ghana (GHA) Thailand (THA)
Iceland (ISL) Sweden (SWE) Guatemala (GTM) Tunisia (TUN)
Ireland (IRL) Switzerland (CHE) Guinea (GIN) Ukraine (UKR)
Israel (ISR) Trinidad and Tobago (TTO) Guyana (GUY) Tanzania (TZA)
Italy (ITA) Turkey (TUR) Honduras (HND) Viet Nam (VNM)
Japan (JPN) United Arab Emirates (ARE) India (IND) Yemen (YEM)
Kazakhstan (KAZ) United Kingdom (GBR) Indonesia (IDN) Zambia (ZMB)
Kuwait (KWT) Uruguay (URY) Jamaica (JAM) Zimbabwe (ZWE)
Venezuela (VEN) United States (USA) Jordan (JOR)
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Chapter 3
Do South Migrants Attract North’s
FDI?
3.1 Introduction
Data on international migration patterns for the second half of the twentieth century
shows some interesting trends. Of the third of the world’s population living in foreign
countries, South-North migration is the fastest growing both in absolute terms, and rel-
ative to North-North, North-South, and South-South migration. Figure 3.1 shows the
movement of South-South, South-North, North-North and North-South migrants from
1970 to 2000. As at the year 2000, South-North movements accounted for 37 percent of
all international migration. While this surge in South-North migration is generally at-
tributed to falling transport and communication costs as well as the prospects of higher
expected wages in the developed world, their consequences on the origin and destina-
tion countries continue to intrigue both researchers and policy makers especially in the
developing world. Among the themes that have gained increasing attention include
remittances (Ratha and Shaw, 2010), brain drain in the countries of origin (Bhargava
and Docquier, 2008), gender and age of entry (Beine et al., 2007) and the implications
of migration on the labor market conditions in the destination countries (Friedberg and
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Hunt, 1995; Borjas, 2003).
However other feedback mechanisms that arise as a result of South-North migration
networks have received little attention. One such mechanism is the relationship between
migration and FDI. As South-North migration has increased over the years, North-
South FDI has also increased tremendously. Figure 2.1 shows the flow of FDI from 30
OECD countries to 101 developing countries used in this study. Between 2000 and 2007
North-South FDI more than doubled. When the increase in South-North migration is
coupled with recent realization that North-South FDI has also grown substantially,
one is likely to expect some bilateral forces at work, but only a handful of researchers
have investigated migration networks and FDI. The existing empirical evidence is so
far limited to country case studies including the United States (Javorcik et al., 2011;
Bhattacharya and Groznik, 2008; Kugler and Rapoport, 2005) and Germany (Buch
et al., 2006). The limitation is that it is difficult to draw conclusions that are applicable
across countries. Moreover while the United States is undoubtedly the most dominant
destination for migrants from all over the world, it will be interesting to investigate
if the derived conclusions from these country case studies are applicable in a cross-
country bilateral framework. However such works are so far impeded by the lack of
South-North bilateral migration data that corresponds to available bilateral FDI data.
Using bilateral migration data on foreign-born citizens in a sample of 22 OECD
countries for the year 2000, and FDI from those countries to 109 developing countries,
this paper investigates the feedback mechanism between South-North migrants and
North-South FDI. It extends the previous country case studies on FDI and migration
to a bilateral cross-country framework. It also analyzes the effect of migration on FDI
in the face of higher startup cost of business in the migrant’s home country. The paper
therefore contributes to the study on a less explored channel through which interna-
tional migration benefits both the origin and the destination country through migrants
who help bridge the information gap between foreign investors and the corporate envi-
ronment in their countries’ of origin.
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The investment environment in most developing countries is riddled with market
imperfections that make it difficult for foreign investors to acquire the information that
is required to make investment decisions. Firms therefore spend substantial amounts
of resources trying to understand the corporate culture, local market conditions, dis-
tribution networks, and the political landscape in these countries. South migrants who
have a better understanding of the business climate in their countries of origin may
prove valuable in filling this knowledge gap when they assimilate in the business envi-
ronment in the North. They understand how the formal and informal sectors coexist,
preferences of local individuals, corporate and labor laws, distributive channels, and
current or future government policies that can affect investors. They may also have
inside political knowledge, information about tax systems, local demand or help firms
source for cheap input and intermediate products. By transferring such knowledge,
there is a feedback mechanism in which South migrants provide information to foreign
firms about investment and profit opportunities that may attract FDI to the migrants’
countries of origin. When multinationals use this knowledge in making investment
decisions about developing countries, transaction costs can be lowered, increasing the
volume of FDI outflow from North to South. However, when start-up costs of invest-
ment in the South is higher, the benefit of the information provided by South migrants
to North investors would be low, since the initial cost of entry would still discourage
foreign investors from entering the local market in the South. Hence in the presence of
higher start-up, the expected positive effect of migration on FDI inflow would be low.
South-North migration should therefore have a positive association with North-South
bilateral FDI stock with the positive association being stronger in the face of lower
initial business start-up cost.
The results suggest that South migrants that relocate in North play a positive role
in attracting FDI from North to South. This positive association is stronger when
the stock of skilled migrants is high. However, I do not find any strong evidence that
higher start-up costs reduce the positive effect of South-North migration on North-
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South FDI. Hence, aside remittances, South migrants bring benefit to their countries’
of origin through information channels that attract investment from North to South.
This paper relates to several bodies of literature that examine why so little capi-
tal flows from rich to poor countries. In a seminal paper, Lucas (1990) asks that if
marginal returns to capital are highest in capital scarce countries, why is there too
little capital flow from developed to developing countries? This phenomenon, often
termed the “Lucas paradox”, has received several important responses. Among them
are the institutional quality argument (Alfaro et al., 2008) and the credit reputation
of countries (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981). Examining the role of different factors be-
hind the the lack of capital flows from rich to poor countries. Alfaro et al. (2008)
argue that differences in institutional quality between rich and poor countries is the
main reason behind the “lucas paradox” between the period 1970-2000. Hence, cor-
rective policies such as protection of private property and political stability in poor
countries can increase the flow of investment funds from rich to poor countries. Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981) present a theoritical and empirical model that show that in the
international private capital market, poor country debt and the possiblity of default or
bankruptcy are the reasons behind why international lenders provide too little capital
to governments of developing countries. Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) emphasize that
one convincing explanation is information asymmetry and market imperfections. They
argue that investors may have a poor knowledge of the domestic market conditions in
a foreign country and may be overcharge in their attempt to acquire assets in another
country by domestic individuals. Portes et al. (2001) also emphasize the importance
of information for capital flows. They argue that information asymmetry accounts for
the strong negative relationship between asset trade and distance especially in the case
of foreigners decision to acquire physical assets in another country.1
1 However with recent surge in FDI from North to South in the past decades, there is a growing
interest in the linkages fostering FDI outflow from North to South, explanations include improvement
in institutions (Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Asiedu, 2006), financial market developments (Ang, 2009;
Hermes and Lensink, 2003) and human capital development (Noorbakhsh et al., 2001).
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This paper also relates to the literature on the network effects between migrants
abroad and FDI attraction into the migrants’ home country. In a recent paper, Javorcik
et al. (2011) investigate the relationship between migrants in the United States and US
FDI in the migrants’ countries of origin. They find that US foreign direct investment
sales abroad is positively associated with migrants’ presence from the host country.
Further the linkages are stronger when the share of tertiary migrants is large.2 Using
German state level data Buch et al. (2006) find that FDI flows into German states
hosting large foreign national from the same country as the FDI. Kugler and Rapoport
(2005) find similar evidence of dynamic complementarity and contemporaneous substi-
tutability between FDI and migrations.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; section 2 describes the dataset used
in the study, section 3 presents the empirical model; section 4 presents the estimation
results and interpretation and section 5 concludes
3.2 The Data
The data base for the paper is a cross section of developed and developing countries
in two years, 2000 and 2005. The set of countries are listed in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. The
dependent variable of interest is the total stock of FDI outflow from North country i
to South country j measured in United States dollars. I use data for the year 2000
and 20005. This data is obtained from the OECD Statistics Portal. South-North
migration is measured as the total stock of foreign-born migrants from South country j
2Bhattacharya and Groznik (2008) also investigate the relationship between US direct and indirect
investment abroad and migrants’ income. For immigrants groups from any particular country, the
higher their income, the higher is US foreign investment in that country.
3Many empirical works have also documented such linkages between bilateral trade volume and
migration networks. For instance Herander and Saavedra (2005) examine the relationship between
state populations of immigrant groups and the volume of state exports to the home country of the
immigrant group and find that migration increases exports to migrants home country. Further the
effect is stronger for newer immigrant groups. Rauch and Trindade (2002) find that ethnic Chinese
networks increases bilateral trade in differentiated goods. Head and Ries (1998) found that Canadian
bilateral trade has a positive association with bilateral migration. Gould (1994) found that US export
is positively influenced by immigration patterns.
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residing in North country i. This dataset is obtained from the World Bank Development
Indicators 2012 (WDI 2012). I also use the total stock of foreign-born skilled migrants
from South country j residing in North country i, which is obtained from the database
on immigrants in OECD and non-OECD countries(DIOC-E). All migration data are
for the year 2000.
Following recent literature on the determinants of FDI, I include a set of control
variables that are either country pair specific or specific to the South country. From the
WDI 2012 data base, I use population size measured as the total population of the host
country to weight the migration variables. GDP per capita measured in 2005 dollars
captures the market size of the host country. Consistent with the horizontal motive for
FDI, large market size attracts more FDI to the host country. Inflation, measured as
the change in the consumer price index is used as a proxy to capture the stability of
the macroeconomic environment in the host country. Sound macroeconomic foundation
creates investment opportunities that attract foreign investors, and consequently more
FDI. Business start-up costs as a percentage of gross national income, captures the
cost of the procedures required to start a business in the migrants’ home countries’.
Higher costs of business start-up raises the initial capital required to start investment
in the South which discourages FDI. In all regressions, the start-up cost data is for the
year 2005, which is the earliest year for which data is available. To capture the effect
of institutional quality on FDI, I use the strength of legal system, which is an index
ranging from 1 to 10 with 10 indicating highest level of legal strength that measures
the strength of a countries legal institutions in the protection of private property and
enforcing contracts.
From the CEPII database, I use common official language, which is a binary variable
equal to 1 when the two countries share a similar language and 0 otherwise to capture
the effect of linguistic ties on FDI outflow from North to South. Sharing a similar
language reduces communication and information barriers which makes cross border
investment easier. Distance measured in kilometers captures the cost of moving capital
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from North country i to South country j. The longer the distance, the less likely is
it that investors would move capital overseas. On, the other hand, to avoid transport
cost, it is also possible that firms would prefer to invest in a country the farther away
that country is from the investors’ home country. Hence the coefficient on distance
could be either positive or negative. Summary statistics concerning the key variables
is reported in table 3.7. Market size, distance, FDI, legal strength and migration enter
the regression in log form, whereas inflation, business start-up costs, linguistic ties, and
colonial relations enter in levels.
3.3 Statistical Estimation
This paper investigates the role of foreign-born South migrants in attracting FDI
from North to South. South migrants may serve as nodes through which information on
the investment climate in the South is transferred to North investors. The estimation
model is assumed to be of the form:
log(FDIij) = γ1log(Migji) + Γ
′Xij + γi + γj + εij (3.1)
where FDIij is the total stock of FDI outflow from North country i to South country
j; Migji is the stock of foreign-born migrants from j residing in i. Depending on
the specification, I use different measures of migration. The first is the total stock of
foreign-born migrants from j residing in i. The second is the total stock of foreign-
born skilled migrants(migrants with at least a tertiary education) from j residing in
i, and finally, the stock of total foreign-born migrants and the total skilled migrants
weighted by the total population of the migrants’ countries of origin; X is a vector of
control variables other than migration that are either bilateral or specific to the South
country. They include the host country’s start-up costs, market size, strength of the
legal system, inflation rate, the bilateral distance between North country i and South
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country j and the colonial relations existing between i and j. γi and γj are North and
South fixed effects respectively, εij is an iid error term, and β, γ, and Γ are parameters.
I estimate a variation of the basic specification which allows the effect of migration
on FDI to depend on the start-up costs of establishing a business in the migrant’s home
country. The objective is to test the hypothesis that, in the face of higher start-up costs,
the positive association between South-North migration and North-South FDI outflow
is small. The corresponding variation of the model is of the following form:
log(FDIij) = γ1log(Migji)+γ2log(Migji)∗(StartupCostj)+Γ′Xij+γi+γj+εij. (3.2)
Notice that the business start-up costs is measured as a percentage of gross national
income. By allowing migration to interact with the start-up costs of business in the
South, the partial effect of migration on FDI attraction can be expressed as follows:
∆log(FDI)
∆log(Mig)
= γ1 + γ2StartupCostj (3.3)
As South migrants residing in North increase, FDI from North to South is expected
to rise, and, γ1 consequently becomes positive. If start-up costs of investment have
a negative effect on FDI as expected, then γ2 is negative, hence as start-up costs
decrease, the positive effect of foreign-born migrants on North’s FDI to South becomes
stronger. In the next section, these models are tested with the data. All estimations
are performed by Ordinary Least Squares.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Total Foreign-Born Migrants, Start-up Costs and FDI
Table 3.1 present the initial OLS results using the total stock of foreign born mi-
grants as the measure of South-North migration. All regressions include North and
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South dummies that capture country specific factors that may influence FDI but are
not captured by the explanatory variables in the model. The dependent variable is the
total stock of FDI from North country i to South country j for the year 2000 expressed
in logs. Hence, the results examine the contemporaneous effect of South-North migra-
tion on North-South FDI. Column (1) presents the basic specification. The coefficient
on the total migrant stock is positive but statistically insignificant. A percent increase
in South-North foreign-born population increases North-South FDI by 0.1 percent.
Start-up costs also have the expected sign. A 1 percent increase in the cost of busi-
ness start-up in the South, decreases North-South FDI by 0.1 percent (start-up costs
enter the equation in levels). The coefficient is significant at 5% significant level. All
the other covariates have the expected signs, North-South FDI is increasing in South’s
market size, strength of legal system, past colonial relations and when the two countries
share a similar language. Distance has a negative and statistically significant effect on
FDI outflow to South, a 1 percent increase in distance decreases FDI by 1 percent. The
coefficient is significant at 1% significance level. The inflation rate, which is purported
to capture macroeconomic instability in the host country also has a negative effect on
FDI, a 1 percent increase in inflation decreases North-South FDI by about 0.7 percent
(inflation enter the equation in levels). The R-square suggests that about 88 percent of
the variation in North-South FDI is explained by changes in the explanatory variables.
Column (2) presents the results of the model that includes the interaction term.
Here, we observe a positive association between the total stock of South-North foreign-
born migrants and North-South FDI outflow. A 1 percent increase in the stock of
South migrants residing in North increases North-South FDI outflow by 0.1 percent,
the coefficient is significant at the 5% significant level. The coefficient on the interaction
term is not statistically different from zero. Hence, holding start-up costs constant,
the partial effect of South-North migration on North-South FDI outflow is given as
0.143 − 0.000(StartupCosts) which is equal to 0.143, when evaluated at the mean of
start-up costs. This suggests that the effect of migration on FDI is not influenced by
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the cost of business start-up in the South. Even with the addition of the interaction
variable, the coefficients on the other regressors are not significantly different from
those obtained in column (1). Market size has a positive but statistically insignificant
effect on FDI. South-North FDI is also increasing in with the strength of the Souths’
legal system, the existence of colonial ties between North and South, and when the
two countries have a similar language. The coefficient of distance is negative and
statistically significant at 1%. A percentage increase in the bilateral distance, decreases
North-South FDI by about 1 percent.
In column (3), the migration variable is weighted by total population. We do not
observe any substantial change in the coefficient on migration when it is weighted by
population, which again has a positive and statistically insignificant effect on FDI.
The coefficients on start-up cost is negative and significant at 5%. The effects of
the other covariates on FDI are not very different from that observed in column (1).
In column (4), the model includes an interaction term for total migration (weighted
by a country’s total population) and the cost of business start-up. We observe a
positive and statistically significant relationship between South-North migration and
North-South FDI. A 1 percent increase in South-North migration increases North-South
FDI by 0.2 percent. The coefficient on the interaction term is also not different from
zero, suggesting that the effect of South migrants on FDI from North to South is not
significantly influenced by start-up cost in the South.
3.4.2 Foreign-Born Skilled Migrants, Start-up Costs and FDI
In Table 3.2, I replace the total stock of foreign-born migrants from South, with
the total stock of skilled migrants. The intuition is that skilled migrants are more
educated, informed and are in a better position to transfer local knowledge to foreign
investors, hence the magnitude of the coefficients on migration on FDI should be higher
when skilled migrants are considered. Column (1) presents OLS results similar to that
Chapter 3. Do South Migrants Attract North’s FDI? 59
of column (1) in Table 3.1. Here, we observe a positive and statistically significant
effect of migration on FDI. A 1 percent increase in the stock of skilled migrants from
South residents in North increases North’s FDI to South by 0.2 percent. The coefficient
is statistically significant at 1%. Start-up costs also have a negative and statistically
significant effect on FDI. A 1 percent increase in start-up costs decreases FDI from
North-South by about 0.8 percent. All the other covariates retain the same signs as in
the previous estimates. Legal strength and colonial ties have positive and statistically
significant effect on FDI, while bilateral distance and inflation have negative effects on
FDI, while market size and linguistic ties have positive effects on FDI attraction, they
do not reach conventional statistical significance.
Column (2) presents the estimation result that includes the interaction variable.
Skilled migrants have a positive and statistically significant effect on FDI. A 1 percent
change in the stock of skilled migrants increases FDI by about 0.3 percent. The start-
up cost, while having the expected sign is not statistically significant. The coefficient
on the interaction term made up of skilled foreign-born migrants and the start-up cost
is statistically not different from zero. Hence we observe that the effect of migration on
FDI is not strongly influenced by the cost of business start-up in the South. Consistent
with previous results, distance, and inflation have negative and statistically significant
effect. All thing equal, a 1 percent increase in inflation decreases FDI by about 8
percent. Colonial relations also has a positive effect on FDI. A 1 percent increase in
colonial ties increases FDI by (e1.358 − 1 = 2.691) about 3 percent. The coefficient
is significant at 1%. Columns (3) and (4) repeats the regressions in columns (1) and
(2) using the the stock of skilled migrants weighted by population as a measure of
migration. We do not observe and substantial change in the coefficients when skilled
migrants are weighted by a country’s total population. Most importantly, we observe
that the coefficient on the interaction term is not quite different from zero, suggesting
that the positive effect of skilled migrants on FDI is not strongly influenced by the
start-up cost of business in the South. Also, all things equal, skilled migrants have a
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positive and statistically significant effect on North-South FDI. A 1 percent increase in
the skilled migrants from South residing in North increases FDI from North to South
by 0.2 and 0.3 percents respectively.
Comparing the results in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 we observe that the coefficients of
migration in Table 3.2 (ranging in values from 0.224 to 0.383) are higher than that
of 3.1 (ranging in values from 0.098 to 0.177). Hence it appears that migrants that
are highly educated attracts more FDI. However, in both tables, the coefficients on
the interaction terms do not appear to be significantly different from zero, suggesting
that the positive effect of migration (both skilled migrants and total migrants) do not
depend on the start-up costs of business in the South country. All the estimation results
maintain sufficient explanatory power with R-squares ranging from 0.874 to 0.885.
3.5 Robustness Results
When analyzing the contemporaneous relationship between migration and FDI,
there can exist potential problems of endogeneity. FDI inflow creates new investment
opportunities, transfer of knowledge, and new jobs that promote economic growth and
limit the economic incentive to migrate. Parent firms may also send workers abroad
to learn and acquire new skills or relocate them in their headquarters. To get around
this potential problem, I use FDI outflows in 2005 as a dependent variable. Hence, I
examine the effect of the total stock of foreign-born migrants from South residing in
North in 2000 on North’s FDI to South in 2005. While FDI in 2000 is more likely to
be correlated with migration in 2000, migration in 2000 is less likely to be correlated
with FDI in 2005. The results are discussed in Tables 3.3 and 3.4.
In Table 3.3, I use the total stock of foreign born migrants as in table 3.1 but uses
the stock of FDI outflow from North to South in 2005. We observe a similar results
for the effects of South-North migration on North-South FDI outflow. An increase in
the stock of foreign born migrants from South to North increases FDI outflow from
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North to South, with coefficients ranging from 0.169 to 0.210. Again, start-up costs
have a negative effect on FDI, suggesting that, as the initial cost of investment in South
increases, FDI inflow from North decreases. The interaction terms appear not to be
significantly different from zero. Hence the effect of migration on FDI again is not
significantly dependent on the cost of business start-up in the South. Another notable
observation is the effects of market size on FDI. Compared to the previous estimates,
market size has a positive and statistically significant effect on FDI. A 1 percent increase
in the size of the local market in the South increases FDI from North by between 1.1
percent and 1.5 percent. Linguistic ties have no significant effect, whereas legal strength
and colonial relations have a positive and statistically significant effects on FDI inflow.
Overall the number of observations appear to be higher, but the explanatory power of
the covariates as evident from the R-square values ranging from 0.836 to 0.839 remains
consistent as in the previous estimates.
Finally, Table 3.4 presents the result using the stock of skilled migrants from South
residing in North. Skilled migrants appear to have a positive effect on FDI inflow from
North to South. All coefficients on skilled migrants remain statistically significant at
the 1% significant level. In columns (2) and (4), the coefficients on the interaction
terms are not significantly different from zero, suggesting that the results obtained in
previous estimates are not arbitrary even when different measures of migration and
FDI are used. North-South FDI is decreasing with bilateral distance and inflation and
increasing with market size, colonial relations and the strength of the legal system in
the South. In columns (3) and (4), where I use total skilled migrants weighted by
population as a measure of migration, the coefficients on start-up cost while having
the expected negative signs do not reach conventional statistical significance. Again,
the regressions maintain significant explanatory power as evident from the R-square
values.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I present evidence on the role of foreign-born South migrants residing
in North in attracting FDI from North to South. I test the hypothesis that higher
stock of South migrants transfer knowledge about the investment climate in the South
that may attract foreign investors from North to South. I also test the hypothesis
that in the presence of higher start-up costs of business in the South, the effect of
South-North migration on North-South FDI is smaller. I perform regression estimates
using different measures of migration and and FDI, the results suggest that South
migrants that relocate in North play a positive role in attracting FDI from North to
South. This positive association is stronger when the stock of skilled migrants is high.
Skilled migrants are more educated, they understand how the political and legal systems
influence the corporate sector. The knowledge they transmit to foreign investors when
they assimilate in the business climate in the North attracts higher FDI to South.
However, I do not find any strong evidence that higher start-up costs reduce the positive
effect of South-North migration on North-South FDI. Hence, aside remittances, South
migrants bring benefit to their countries’ of origin through information channels that
attract investment from North to South.
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3.7 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Foreign-Born South Migrants and North-South
FDI in 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Migrants 0.098 0.143**
(0.064) (0.070)
Total Migrants 0.099** 0.177**
(weighted by Population) (0.045) (0.074)
Start-up Cost -0.011** -0.009* -0.011** -0.011**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Total Migrants*Start-up Cost -0.000*
(0.000)
Total Migrants*Start-up Cost 0.000
(0.000)
Market Size 0.462 0.368 0.675 0.763
(0.518) (0.519) (0.502) (0.523)
Legal Strength 0.817*** 0.827*** 0.777*** 0.842***
(0.177) (0.176) (0.178) (0.185)
Distance -1.182*** -1.155*** -1.182*** -1.276***
(0.246) (0.246) (0.246) (0.256)
Colonial Relation 1.511*** 1.597*** 1.511*** 1.435***
(0.366) (0.368) (0.366) (0.400)
Linguistic Ties 0.511* 0.440 0.511* 0.331
(0.279) (0.282) (0.279) (0.307)
Inflation -0.078* -0.078* -0.085** -0.099**
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.045)
Observations 376 376 376 322
R-squared 0.876 0.877 0.876 0.874
Robust standard errors clustered around country pairs are in paren-
theses. All regressions include North and South fixed effect. Con-
stant terms are not reported. *, ** and *** indicate significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Migration and FDI datasets are for
the year 2000. Columns (3) and (4) use total migration weighted by
population as the dependent variable of interest.
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Table 3.2: Foreign-Born Skilled Migrants from South and
North-South FDI in 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skilled Migrants 0.224*** 0.270***
(0.072) (0.075)
Skilled Migrants 0.215*** 0.383***
(weighted by Population) (0.026) (0.095)
Start-up Cost -0.008* -0.006 -0.006 -0.012**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Skilled Migrants*Start-up Cost -0.001**
(0.000)
Skilled Migrants*Start-up Cost -0.001**
(0.000)
Market Size 0.307 0.226 0.793 0.774
(0.511) (0.509) (0.491) (0.488)
Legal System 0.845*** 0.854*** 0.753*** 0.752***
(0.173) (0.172) (0.174) (0.173)
Distance -1.158*** -1.145*** -1.158*** -1.145***
(0.243) (0.241) (0.243) (0.241)
Colonial Relation 1.262*** 1.358*** 1.262*** 1.358***
(0.373) (0.374) (0.373) (0.374)
Linguistic Ties 0.364 0.333 0.364 0.333
(0.282) (0.281) (0.282) (0.281)
Inflation -0.079** -0.078** -0.096** -0.097**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Observations 357 357 357 357
R-squared 0.883 0.885 0.883 0.885
Robust standard errors clustered around country pairs are in paren-
theses. All regressions include North and South fixed effect. Constant
terms are not reported. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%,
5%, and 1% respectively. Skilled Migration and FDI datasets are for
the year 2000. Columns (3) and (4) use total migration weighted by
population as the dependent variable of interest.
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Table 3.3: Foreign-Born South Migrants and North-South
FDI in 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Migrants 0.169*** 0.210***
(0.047) (0.051)
Total Migrants 0.169*** 0.190***
(weighted by Population) (0.047) (0.052)
Start-up Cost -0.009** -0.007* -0.007** -0.008**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Total Migrants*Start-up Cost -0.000**
(0.000)
Total Migrants*Start-up Cost 0.000
(0.000)
Market Size 1.148*** 1.074*** 1.515*** 1.538***
(0.336) (0.337) (0.324) (0.341)
Legal Strength 0.482*** 0.486*** 0.413*** 0.394***
(0.129) (0.128) (0.131) (0.134)
Distance -1.239*** -1.207*** -1.239*** -1.266***
(0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.170)
Colonial Relations 1.802*** 1.853*** 1.802*** 1.710***
(0.289) (0.289) (0.289) (0.299)
Linguistic Ties 0.040 -0.014 0.040 -0.018
(0.209) (0.210) (0.209) (0.218)
Inflation -0.103*** -0.102*** -0.116*** -0.113***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028)
Observations 702 702 702 611
R-squared 0.836 0.837 0.836 0.839
Robust standard errors clustered around country pairs are in paren-
theses. All regressions include North and South fixed effect. Constant
terms are not reported. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%,
5%, and 1% respectively. Skilled Migration and FDI datasets are for
the year 2005. Columns (3) and (4) use total migration weighted by
population as the dependent variable of interest.
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Table 3.4: Foreign-Born Skilled Migrants from South and
North-South FDI in 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skilled Migrants 0.273*** 0.280***
(0.051) (0.055)
Skilled Migrants 0.182*** 0.281***
(weighted by Population) (0.026) (0.054)
Start-up Cost -0.008** -0.008** -0.006 -0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Skilled Migrants * Start-up Cost -0.000
(0.000)
Skilled Migrants * Start-up Cost -0.000
(0.000)
Market Size 0.969*** 0.959*** 1.563*** 1.563***
(0.332) (0.334) (0.320) (0.320)
Legal Strength 0.478*** 0.478*** 0.366*** 0.364***
(0.127) (0.127) (0.129) (0.129)
Distance -1.152*** -1.147*** -1.152*** -1.147***
(0.160) (0.161) (0.160) (0.161)
Colonial Relations 1.608*** 1.614*** 1.608*** 1.614***
(0.291) (0.292) (0.291) (0.292)
Linguistic Ties -0.140 -0.147 -0.140 -0.147
(0.210) (0.211) (0.210) (0.211)
Inflation -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.115*** -0.116***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Observations 671 671 671 671
R-squared 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842
Robust standard errors clustered around country pairs are in paren-
theses. All regressions include North and South fixed effect. Constant
terms are not reported. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%,
5%, and 1% respectively. Skilled Migration dataset is for 2000 and FDI
dataset is for 2005. Columns (3) and (4) use total migration weighted
by population as the dependent variable of interest.
Chapter 3. Do South Migrants Attract North’s FDI? 67
Table 3.5: List of South Countries
Afghanistan(AFG) Dominica(DMA) Lesotho(LSO) Seychelles(SYC)
Albania(ALB) Dominican Republic(DOM) Liberia(LBR) Sierra Leone(SLE)
Algeria(DZA) Ecuador(ECU) Libyan (LBY) Solomon Islands(SLB)
Angola(AGO) Egypt(EGY) Madagascar(MDG ) Somalia (SOM)
Argentina(ARG) El Salvador(SLV) Malawi(MWI) South Africa(ZAF)
Bangladesh(BGD) Eritrea(ERI) Malaysia (MYS) Sri Lanka(LKA)
Belarus(BLR) Ethiopia(ETH) Maldives(MDV) Sudan(SDN)
Belize(BLZ) Fiji(FJI ) Mali(MLI) Suriname(SUR)
Benin(BEN) Gabon(GAB) Mauritania(MRT) Swaziland(SWZ)
Bhutan(BTN) Gambia(GMB) Mauritius(MUS) Tanzania(TZA)
Bolivia(BOL) Georgia(GEO) Morocco(MAR) Thailand(THA)
Botswana(BWA) Ghana(GHA) Mozambique(MOZ) Togo (TGO)
Brazil(BRA) Grenada(GRD) Namibia(NAM) Tunisia(TUN)
Bulgaria(BGR) Guatemala (GTM) Nepal(NPL) Uganda(UGA )
Burkina Faso(BFA) Guinea(GIN) Nicaragua(NIC) Ukraine(UKR)
Burundi(BDI) Guinea-Bissau(GNB) Niger(NER) Uruguay(URY)
Cambodia(KHM) Guyana(GUY) Nigeria(NGA) Venezuela(VEN)
Cameroon(CMR) Haiti(HTI) Pakistan(PAK) Viet Nam(VNM)
Cape Verde(CPV) Honduras(HND) Palau(PLW) Yemen(YEM)
Central African Rep.(CAF) India(IND) Panama(PAN) Zambia(ZMB)
Chad (TCD) Indonesia(IDN) Papua New Guine(PNG) Zimbabwe(ZWE)




Congo, the Dem. Rep. (COG) Kenya(KEN) Rwanda( RWA )
Costa Rica (CRI ) Kiribati (KIR ) Samoa(WSM)
Cuba (CUB) North Korea(PRK) Sao Tome and Principe(STP)
Djibouti(DJI) Lebanon(LBN) Senegal(SEN)
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Table 3.7: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Legal Strength (2005) 1839.00 4.54 2.36 0.00 10.00
log(Distance) 1926.00 8.82 0.56 6.43 9.86
log(Total Migrants) 1165.00 6.66 2.73 0.00 14.12
log(Skilled Migrants) 1117.00 5.44 2.73 0.00 13.40
log(GDP per Capita) 1859.00 6.85 1.12 4.46 8.95
Linguistic Ties 1926.00 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
Colonial Relations 1926.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Log (FDI) (2000) 787.00 2.55 2.79 -2.06 10.51
Log(FDI) (2005) 1451.00 1.97 2.67 -2.17 10.34
Start-up Costs 1839.00 111.13 175.44 4.70 1190.00
Chapter 3. Do South Migrants Attract North’s FDI? 69










1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
South North South South
North South North North
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